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The Social Construction of Regulation:
Lessons from the War Against Command and
Control
TIMOTHY F. MALLOY†
INTRODUCTION
We all know that legal rules are the products of political
institutions engaged in formal procedures—the legislature,
the courts, and the regulatory agency.1 Yet, quite apart from
the formal production of law by political institutions, law is
constructed in another way as well. Judges, regulatory
agencies, and the regulated community shape the law
within the social context in which they operate, constructing
legal interpretations, rules, and regimes that elaborate on
or even vary from the basic law.2 This Article focuses on
neither the political institutions that create the formal law,
nor on the social context in which it is implemented. Rather,
it deals with yet a third form of construction: the activities
carried on by legal scholars who critique, defend, and
ultimately seek to reform the law.
† Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. The author wishes to thank Rick Abel,
Joel Best, Russell Korobkin, Fran Olson, and the participants in the UCLA
School of Law Works-in-Progress Workshop for their useful comments on earlier
versions of this Article. Special thanks to Renee Floyd, Michael Meresak, and
Jonathon Miles of UCLA Law School for thoughtful and careful research
assistance.
1. See IAN HACKING, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF WHAT? 12-13 (1999)
(contending that because law obviously results from social processes, little is
gained by characterizing it as socially constructed); see also JOHN R. SEARLE,
THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 2-4 (1995) (discussing “the complex
structure of social reality”).
2. See MIA L. CAHILL, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
LAW 3-4 (2001); Lauren B. Edelman et al., Professional Construction of Law: The
Inflated Threat of Wrongful Discharge, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 47 (1992).
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Scholars, myself included, rely upon socially constructed
views of the existing regulatory system in the pursuit of
reform. I use the concept of “regulatory system” broadly to
include the formal structure and substance of the law, the
manner in which it is implemented, and the capacities and
activities of the implementing entities. A scholar’s
construction of the law, of what the law requires and how it
operates, drives her perception of the law’s defects and
limitations, and consequently shapes her view of the
necessary reforms. Thus, myopic reliance upon a single
construction can lead the scholar to champion misdirected
or incomplete reforms and to ignore other viable approaches
for improving regulatory outcomes.
Sociologists working within the social problems
discipline have developed a relatively well-defined
constructionist approach over the last four decades, using it
to examine discourse and activism concerning a range of
social conditions. While the proper role and mode of
constructionist analysis is still debated,3 Sarbin and
Kitsuse’s formulation is instructive: “Constructionists focus
on how ordinary members (and sometimes professionals)
create and employ constructions, on observing how others
interact with those constructions, and on interpreting and
sometimes proposing alternate constructions.”4 This Article
draws upon that strain of social problems literature to
analyze the legal scholarship regarding reform of the socalled “command and control” regulatory system in
environmental law. For these purposes, by command and
control regulation, I mean the issuance of prescriptive rules
intended to directly control the behavior of private actors.
Bashing traditional regulation has become something of
a national pastime among legal scholars, supporting a
stream of reform proposals from the seventies to present
day.5 Although the criticisms of command and control
3. See IMAGES OF ISSUES: TYPIFYING CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL PROBLEMS 337
(Joel Best ed., 1995).
4. CONSTRUCTING
eds., 1994).

THE

SOCIAL, at x (Theodore R. Sarbin & John I. Kitsuse

5. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation:
TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO.
L.J. 257 (2001); James E. Krier, The Irrational National Air Quality Standards:
Macro- and Micro-Mistakes, 22 UCLA L. REV. 323 (1974); Richard B. Stewart,
Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law: A Conceptual Framework, 69
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regulation are legion, they can be largely distilled down to
three propositions which, when taken individually and
together, reflect a broadly accepted view of our regulatory
system. First, the rigidity proposition states that regulation
essentially requires firms to use specified technologies to
reduce pollution. Second, the homogeneity proposition posits
that command and control regulation applies a one-size-fitsall approach that fails to distinguish among firms in terms
of their economic, technological, or organizational capacities
to reduce emissions. Third, the competency proposition holds
that individual firms are better able than the government to
collect and act upon information regarding pollution
generation and management.
Using an empirical analysis of citation patterns in the
legal literature, I argue that most legal scholars considering
environmental regulation have uncritically adopted one or
more of these propositions, leading to a particular social
construction of the structure of regulation, as well as the
relative capacities of the government agency and the
regulated firm. This construction has framed the debate
over the direction of regulatory reform within the legal
academy. Take the rigidity proposition and the competency
proposition—when combined, they create the scenario of the
innovative firm frustrated in its efforts to manage pollution
by the unyielding, centralized bureaucracy. Innovation is
stifled, and pollution management is dominated by a onesize-fits-all approach developed by the uninformed,
centralized regulatory agency. With the problem thus
defined, reform efforts focused on the structure of
traditional regulation as the root cause, and the innovative
capacities of the firm as the solution. The search for
alternative regulatory approaches was on.
There is, however, another perspective. What if the lack
of innovation flowed not from the structure of the regulation
but from something else? Suppose that the firm is not quite
the mythic figure scholars expect. What if most firms were
not hotbeds of innovation, but instead cautious and even
sluggish mimics, preferring to follow rather than lead? In
that case, the reforms flowing from the conventionally
accepted construction of traditional regulation may be
directed at a false target. Considering alternative
CAL. L. REV. 1256 (1981); Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Substance, 1991
DUKE L.J. 607.
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constructions of existing regulation can help focus attention
on more salient reforms.
This Article describes one such alternative construction.
In this construction, regulation does not redirect firm
behavior, but rather celebrates it, or at least the best of it.
Moreover, it does not constrain innovation, but instead
clears a path for it. That at least is the structure of the
regulation. In practice, however, it appears that the full
potential of the structure has yet to be achieved. While
traditional regulation has spurred the diffusion of numerous
existing technologies throughout a variety of industry
sectors, there is little evidence that it has ignited the
widespread development of new technologies. Likewise,
businesses apparently have not seized upon the flexibility in
the regulations to adopt facility-specific strategies for
pollution reduction.
Thus the conventional and alternative constructions
face a similar question: What are the barriers to the
development and deployment of effective, innovative
technologies and strategies for pollution reduction? The
conventional construction fixes the blame on command and
control regulation, seeking changes that free industry from
government interference. The alternative construction
admits the possibility that other factors, including the
structure of the relevant industry sector and the internal
features of the constituent firms, are the more formidable
barriers.
One may fairly ask why we ought to apply a
constructionist frame here—why not simply point out the
empirical deficiencies in the existing literature and argue
for different reforms or no reform at all? The answer reflects
my focus on process rather than on specific substantive
reforms. While the direction of reform is clearly important,
this Article focuses on the means by which scholars develop
and debate reform proposals. How is it that the majority of
legal scholars engaged in the regulatory reform debates
have come to base their substantive positions upon
unsubstantiated and incomplete assumptions about legal
texts, regulatory implementation, and the relative
capacities of business and government? What are the
consequences of that in terms of the usefulness of the
resulting reform proposals? The constructionist lens
provides a useful framework for getting at those questions,
and emphasizes the point that the manner in which legal
scholars frame “the problem” can unduly constrain the
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range of reforms considered. Indeed, my point is not that my
construction is “right” and that the conventionally accepted
construction is “wrong.” Instead, I argue that scholars ought
to explicitly take into account the contingent nature of
problems in considering whether and how our regulatory
systems should be reformed.
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the concept
of social construction, focusing on social problems literature.
Sociologists working in this area ask how social interactions
influence the identification of particular social conditions as
problems requiring response by public authorities. Most
formulations of constructionist social problems theory focus
on two concepts: claims-making and institutionalization.
Claims-making is the process by which actors define the
existence, nature, and scope of a putative social problem.
Institutionalization is the process by which government
responds to a generally accepted social problem through
policy. Joel Best, a leading social problems scholar,
identified three foci for such constructionist analysis of the
claims-making process: the claims, the claims-makers and
their social links, and the competing claims. Parts II
through IV of this Article examine each of those foci in turn,
characterizing legal literature on regulatory reform as an
exercise in claims-making.
For analytical purposes, Part II breaks the claims
underlying the conventional construction into three
components: grounds, warrants, and conclusions. Grounds
essentially delineate the condition at issue by defining the
purported problem, providing examples and case studies,
and estimating its magnitude. Warrants are justifications
for reform; they typically draw upon a set of commonly held
values (such as protection of the young, economic efficiency,
or equality of treatment) to drive a change in the status quo.
The conclusions set out the necessary reform.
The conclusions of the conventional construction are
clear: adoption of a variety of market–based reforms
intended to leverage the regulated firms’ natural pursuit of
innovation and efficiency. Part II instead focuses on the
grounds and warrants supporting the conventional
construction. It posits that the legal literature uses the
rigidity, homogeneity, and competency propositions as
grounds for that construction. Further, Part II identifies
two primary warrants used by proponents of the
conventional construction: economic efficiency and
technological innovation.
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Part III turns to the empirical evidence regarding
several aspects of the conventional construction. First,
using the bibliometric technique of citation analysis and
content analysis, it examines whether a conventional
construction exists. Based upon examination of 135 articles
and books published over the last three decades, it
concludes that there was relatively broad reliance upon and
acceptance of the three propositions and associated
warrants by the relevant legal scholars. Part III also
explores the empirical evidence garnered by the proponents
of
the
conventional
construction.
This
analysis
demonstrates an astonishingly thin level of factual support
for these three propositions.
Part IV presents an alternative construction of existing
regulation.6 Challenging the rigidity proposition, this
construction conceptualizes traditional regulation as
generally applicable performance standards based upon the
best practices used within the relevant industry sector.
Thus, a traditional rule typically sets out a performance
standard such as a limit on the level of pollutants emitted
from the regulated unit. This performance standard is set
by reference to one or more technologies or operating
practices—often called the “reference” technology—used by
the best performing firms in the relevant sector. In
achieving that emission limit, individual facilities may
choose an alternative to the reference technology so long as
that alternative achieves the performance standard. Part IV
uses two core air quality programs to demonstrate the
pervasive use of the best practices approach: the New
Source Performance Standards (NSPS) and the National
Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants
(NESHAP).
Again using the NSPS and NESHAP programs, Part IV
also demonstrates that the rules and rule development
process are starkly different from the one-size-fits-all
approach suggested by the homogeneity proposition. The
regulatory agency works closely with the industry to collect,
coordinate, and synthesize technical, economic, and
operational data from affected facilities during the
6. Unlike the conventional construction, there is no broad network of legal
scholars embracing this view. In fact, while various scholars have adopted
aspects of this alternative view, this Article appears to be the first articulation
of it as an integrated construction of traditional regulation.
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rulemaking process. Similar operations and facilities are
grouped together and emission standards are crafted to fit
the characteristics of those customized groups. Likewise,
Part IV challenges the competency proposition’s depiction of
rulemaking as “central planning” ill-suited to the capacities
of government. It provides a comparative assessment of the
relative capacity of firms, trade associations, and the
government to identify industry best practices.
Part V concludes by considering the overall
implications. At a general level, legal scholarship seeking to
reform legal regimes or regulatory programs should be selfreflective; i.e., it should expressly articulate and challenge
its own core propositions. Moreover, such scholarship would
be greatly improved by more attention to empirical
concerns. That said, the quest for more empirical data often
fails to resolve differences between competing constructions,
yet policy development must proceed. Part V offers two
strategies for dealing with such uncertainty. The relative
plausibility strategy calls for reliance upon the construction
that is most plausible given the available information. The
hedging strategy adopts a neutral stance and counsels
development of a policy expected to produce acceptable
outcomes under either construction.
I. CONSTRUCTIONISM AND THE LAW
Generally speaking, social constructionism holds that
our understanding of the world is created and sustained
through various social interactions.7 The concept of social
construction is widely used but rarely defined with any
precision.8 In large part, the difficulty in defining the
7. Taking a cue from Theodore Sarbin and John Kitsuse, I use the terms
“constructionist” and “constructionism” throughout this Article rather than
other variants, such as “constructivist.” CONSTRUCTING THE SOCIAL, supra note 4,
at x.
8. Since Berger and Luckmann first articulated social construction as a
stand-alone theory in the mid-1960s, it has been used to analyze a host of
subjects, including gender, nature, technological systems, women refugees, the
market, illness, drug use, environmental regulation, and even pollution. PETER
L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY: A
TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (1966); see also VIVIEN BURR, AN
INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM 14 (1995); HACKING, supra note 1, at
1-2 (describing works that apply social construction theories to gender, nature,
technological systems, women refugees, illness, and many other subjects);
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concept springs from its multidisciplinary nature. Social
constructionism is derived from and used in a variety of
social sciences, including sociology, social psychology, and
linguistics.9 Rather than being a clearly defined theory
associated with a well delineated methodology, social
constructionism has been described by one of its
practitioners as “somewhat of a mess.”10 Another proponent
more tactfully portrayed it as “a loose collection of
theoretical perspectives” that share several tenets.11 Two of
those tenets are particularly relevant to my evaluation of
legal scholars’ treatment of regulation.
First, social constructionism is critical of “taken as
granted” knowledge of the world around us. It questions
whether commonly held perceptions and understandings of
the world and of how it is structured actually reflect the
“true” nature of things.12 For example, it views concepts
such as gender, race, and mental illness as constructs
rather than objective reality.13 Second, our understanding of
the world is developed and sustained through social
interactions. In their treatise on the sociology of knowledge,
Berger and Luckmann describe the social process by which
Stephen Fineman, Street-level Bureaucrats and the Social Construction of
Environmental Control, 19 ORG. STUD. 953 (1998).
9. See BERGER & LUCKMANN, supra note 8 (developing social constructionism
in the context of the sociology of knowledge); BURR, supra note 8, at 2; KENNETH
J. GERGEN, AN INVITATION TO SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION (1999); Joseph W.
Schneider, Social Problems Theory: The Constructionist View, 11 ANN. REV. SOC.
209 (1985) (providing an overview of social constructionism in social problems
research by sociologists).
10. NANCY HARDING, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION
IDENTITIES 7 (2003).

OF

MANAGEMENT: TEXTS

AND

11. BURR, supra note 8, at 3.
12. Id.; HACKING, supra note 1, at 6.
13. See BURR, supra note 8, at 3; GERGEN, supra note 9, at 63. There is
significant debate among social constructionists regarding the nature of the
external world. While some contend that there is no “reality” out there, others
claim that there is an external reality that acts as a constraint upon the possible
constructs. See HARDING, supra note 10, at 9; DAVID KERTZNER, RITUAL, POLITICS
AND POWER 4 (1988) (“That people perceive the world through symbolic lenses
does not mean that . . . all such constructs are equally tenable in the material
world.”); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV.
943, 950 n.19 (“What is ‘possible’ hangs upon particular histories and material
conditions, and the constraints of both are real.”); Schneider, supra note 9, at
223-24.
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ideas or practices secure an aura of objective factual
existence through repetition and broadened adoption by
more and more members of the relevant social group.14 New
entrants into the social group internalize the idea or
practice through socialization.15
The corresponding notion that law is shaped by social
interaction dates back to Roscoe Pound’s classic distinction
between law in the books and law in action.16 Since then,
law and society scholars and researchers in other fields
have explored that gap in a variety of contexts.17 Of
particular relevance to this Article, one thread of research
examined how public and private parties charged with
implementing laws shaped the content of those laws
through social interactions.18 So, for example, using the
concept of the “street-level bureaucrat,” organizational
theorists, as well as law and society scholars, demonstrated
that “front-line” law enforcement personnel “reconstitute” or
“construct” the law through social interactions with each
14. Berger and Luckmann (and, I suppose, Stephen Colbert) call this
“facticity.” BERGER & LUCKMANN, supra note 8, at 20, 35, 60.
15. Id. at 61, 114, 129-73, 178-79, 163-73.
16. Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 15
(1910); see also Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law and Society Movement, 38
STAN. L. REV. 763, 764 (1986) (dating the beginning of the law and society
movement, with its view of the legal system as a social creation, to the
nineteenth century); Edward L. Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of Legal
Scholarship, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1835, 1855-58 (1988) (discussing the rise of legal
scholarship with legal realism).
17. See Friedman, supra note 16, at 764-66; Carroll Seron & Susan S. Silbey,
Profession, Science, and Culture: An Emergent Canon of Law and Society
Research, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO LAW AND SOCIETY 30, 32-35 (Austin
Sarat ed., 2004); Richard L. Abel, Law Books and Books About Law, 26 STAN. L.
REV. 175, 184-89 (1974) (book review) (discussing the nature and potential
sources of the gap).
18. Seron & Silbey, supra note 17, at 36-49 (describing the law and society
literature in this regard). Sociologists and legal scholars have also examined the
role of local legal culture in shaping the application of procedural rules and
substantive law in local courts. See Thomas W. Church, Jr., Examining Local
Legal Culture, 1985 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 449; Lynn M. LoPucki, Legal Culture,
Legal Strategy, and the Law in Lawyers’ Heads, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1498, 1501-02
(1996) (examining how lawyers within a community develop “shared mental
model[s]” of what the law is); Teresa A. Sullivan et al., The Persistence of Local
Legal Culture: Twenty Years of Evidence from the Federal Bankruptcy Courts, 17
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 801, 804 (1994).
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other and with the targets of regulation.19 Professor
Edelman and others have likewise examined the
construction of employment law by human resource
professionals within the regulated entities, as well as the
lawyers that serve them.20 She also identified a role for legal
scholars, noting that “[a]cademics construct the law when
they write critiques of judicial decisions and commentary on
what they see as developing legal trends.”21
Professor Edelman’s evaluation of legal scholars’
activity was somewhat limited in scope; she essentially used
their construction of the common law of wrongful discharge
as a foil for the more ominous construction given by human
resource professionals.22 Accordingly, there was little
express discussion of how scholars engage in construction
beyond references to production of law review articles. The
constructionist social problems literature provides useful
guidance in answering that question.
Constructionist social problems scholars are interested
in how social interactions shape our shared characterization
of particular social conditions (such as drug and alcohol
abuse or teenage sex) as pressing issues requiring public
action.23 Most formulations focus on two concepts: “claims19. See MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE
INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICES (1980) (explaining the origins of the street-level
bureaucrat concept); Stephen Fineman, supra note 8, at 954; Ryken Grattet &
Valerie Jenness, The Reconstitution of Law in Local Settings: Agency Discretion,
Ambiguity, and a Surplus of Law in the Policing of Hate Crime, 39 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 893, 935 (2005).
20. See Edelman et al., supra note 2, at 47-48. For these purposes, Edelman
and her coauthors define construction of law as the “extraction, interpretation,
and dissemination” of legal rules. In the article, however, they focus upon the
professionals’ construction of the threat of wrongful discharge. Id.; see also
Lauren B. Edelman & Mark C. Suchman, The Legal Environments of
Organizations, 23 ANN. REV. SOC. 479, 505 (1997) (“[O]rganizations (and
organized professions) participate actively in the social construction processes
that give new laws their meanings.”).
21. Edelman et al., supra note 2, at 61.
22. Id. at 68-69.
23. See MALCOLM SPECTOR & JOHN I. KITSUSE, CONSTRUCTING SOCIAL
PROBLEMS 73-76 (2001); Joel Best, Constructing the Sociology of Social Problems:
Spector and Kitsuse Twenty-Five Years Later, 17 SOC. F. 699, 702-03 (2002);
(discussing the emergence of the constructionist social problems literature);
Schneider, supra note 9 (providing an overview of social problems theory and a
survey of literature).
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making” and institutionalization.24 Claims-making is the
process by which actors—individuals or organizations—
attempt to define the existence, nature, and scope of a
putative negative condition and secure recognition of it as a
pressing social issue requiring action.25 Like the processes
articulated by Berger and Luckmann, claims-making
generates consensus within the relevant social group to
such an extent that the characterization of a social
condition as a problem is widely assumed. Claims-makers
use a variety of techniques to advance their claims,
including performing research to identify the existence and
impact of the putative condition and developing specialized
rhetoric.26
Institutionalization is the process by which the
government responds to a generally accepted social
problem, usually through a law or administrative program.27
For example, drunk driving emerged in the 1980s as a
compelling social problem through claims-making by a
24. One of the leading formulations speaks of the life cycle of a social
problem, which begins with “claims-making” (or discovery), followed by
institutionalization, reemergence of claims, and search for an alternative
responding institution. SPECTOR & KITSUSE, supra note 23, at 142-54; see also
LAURA E. GÓMEZ, MISCONCEIVING MOTHERS: LEGISLATORS, PROSECUTORS, AND THE
POLITICS OF PRENATAL DRUG EXPOSURE 7 (1997) (proposing a streamlined
conceptualization of the construction process with only two stages: discovery
and institutionalization). The natural history approach has been the subject of
significant criticism, and to some extent supplanted by an ecological approach,
which focuses more on the competition among claims for attention in the public
arena. See Stephen Hilgartner & Charles L. Bosk, The Rise and Fall of Social
Problems: A Public Arenas Model, 94 AM. J. SOC. 53 (1988). For other
approaches, see JOEL BEST, SOCIAL PROBLEMS (2008); and J. A. HANNIGAN,
ENVIRONMENTAL SOCIOLOGY: A SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONIST PERSPECTIVE (2006).
25. In fact, many constructionist theorists define the very concept of a social
problem by reference to social interactions. In a seminal work, for example,
Spector and Kitsuse define it as the “activities of individuals or groups making
assertions of grievances and claims with respect to some putative conditions.”
SPECTOR & KITSUSE, supra note 23, at 75; see also GÓMEZ, supra note 24, at 5
(“[T]he constructionist approach views social problems as the product of
interactions among social actors . . . .”).
26. GÓMEZ, supra note 24, at 6; HANNIGAN, supra note 24, at 64-65;
Schneider, supra note 9, at 211; Dorceta E. Taylor, The Rise of the
Environmental Justice Paradigm: Injustice Framing and the Social
Construction of Environmental Discourses, 43 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 508, 510
(2000) (describing types of rhetoric employed by claims-makers).
27. GÓMEZ, supra note 24, at 7.
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variety of groups such as Mothers Against Drunk Driving,
leading to institutional responses by legislatures and law
enforcement agencies in the form of increased enforcement,
stiffer penalties, and support of treatment programs.28
Likewise, environmental organizations, public health
officials, scientists, and others in the public arena have
engaged in successful claims-making on a range of
environmental
issues
for
years.29
Our
extensive
environmental regulatory system reflects one type of
institutional response.
Constructionist social problems theorists make two
points regarding claims-making that are of particular
importance to my thesis. First, claims-makers are not
simply engaged in the articulation of a social problem. In
identifying and defining the nature and scope of the
problem, they seek to establish “ownership” of the
problem—that is, to control the discourse about the
existence, causes of, and remedies for the problem.30 The
notion that an individual or group can “own” a social
problem implies that claims-making is often a competitive
enterprise in which one or more entities battle over the
right to define the claim and influence the institutional

28. Joseph R. Gusfield, The Control of Drinking-Driving in the United States:
A Period in Transition?, in SOCIAL CONTROL OF THE DRINKING DRIVER 109-11
(Michael D. Laurence et al. eds., 1988); Craig Reinarman, The Social
Construction of an Alcohol Problem: The Case of Mothers Against Drunk Drivers
and Social Control in the 1980s, 17 THEORY & SOC’Y 91 (1988).
29. See Kate Burningham, A Noisy Road or Noisy Resident?: A Demonstration
of the Utility of Social Constructionism for Analysing Environmental Problems,
46 SOC. REV. 536 (1998); Sheldon Ungar, The Rise and (Relative) Decline of
Global Warming as a Social Problem, 33 SOC. Q. 483 (1992); Jerry Williams,
Knowledge, Consequences, and Experience: The Social Construction of
Environmental Problems, 68 SOC. INQUIRY 476, 483-85 (1998). But see Riley E.
Dunlap & William R. Catton, Jr., Struggling with Human Exemptionalism: The
Rise, Decline and Revitalization of Environmental Sociology, 25 AM. SOC. 5, 2023 (1994) (articulating the limitations of constructionist approaches). Studies of
environmental social problems typically focus upon the initial claims-making
activities and institutional responses rather than their aftermath. See Taylor,
supra note 26 (examining origins of environmental justice claims-making);
Ungar, supra (examining the rise and fall of global warming as a problem in the
social arena).
30. JOSEPH R. GUSFIELD, THE CULTURE OF PUBLIC PROBLEMS: DRINKINGDRIVING AND THE SYMBOLIC ORDER 10-13 (1981).
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response.31 Second, claims-making and institutionalization
are not mutually exclusive processes; claims-making
activities—either by the initial proponents or new claimsmakers—often continues during the institutionalization
phase. Thus, groups within government may compete for
control over the problem through a second round of claimsmaking. Alternatively, groups who are dissatisfied with the
institutional response may seek to redefine the original
social problem in some manner, or engage in supplemental
claims-making regarding the nature or efficacy of the
institutional response.32
Such a constructionist approach provides a useful way
of thinking about the activities of legal scholars engaged in
environmental regulatory reform efforts. For these
purposes, the life story of environmental regulation can be
broken into two periods: the initial flurry of claims-making
activity from the late 1960s through the 1970s, and the
thirty years since. The proliferation of federal
environmental laws and agencies in the 1970s constitutes
the institutional response to, among other things, the
claims-making activities by the environmental movement
and others regarding a range of putative conditions.33
During the 1970s, as the statutes were implemented
through regulation, competition over “ownership” of
environmental social problems and their solution continued.
By the end of that decade, however, so-called command and
control regulation was in place throughout federal
environmental law. Legal scholars began to articulate a
variation on initial environmental social problems—call it
ineffective institutional response—in their scathing
criticism of command and control regulation. Thus, through
their legal scholarship and other activities, they engaged in
claims-making seeking to modify the government’s

31. GÓMEZ, supra note 24, at 6-7; GUSFIELD, supra note 30, at 43; DONILEEN
R. LOSEKE, THINKING ABOUT SOCIAL PROBLEMS: AN INTRODUCTION TO
CONSTRUCTIONIST PERSPECTIVES 53-54 (2d ed. 2003).
32. GÓMEZ, supra note 24, at 7, 33 (drawing a distinction between first and
second round claims-making).
33. See Riley E. Dunlap & Angela G. Mertig, The Evolution of the U.S.
Environmental Movement from 1970-1990: An Overview, in AMERICAN
ENVIRONMENTALISM: THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT, 1970-1990, at 1, 4
(Riley E. Dunlap & Angela G. Mertig eds., 1992).
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institutional response to the earlier waves of claimsmaking.
Constructionism is more than a theory; it is also a
useful analytic tool.34 While constructionist analysis is still
vigorously debated even among its adherents,35 Joel Best’s
identification of three potential foci for constructionist
analysis appears to be generally accepted.36 First, analysis
may concentrate on the claims themselves, and in particular
on the rhetoric of claims-making used to typify and support
the claims. A second focal point is claims-makers, their
identity, interests, and social links. Third, analysis might
consider the structure of the claims-making process,
including the nature of the audience and the existence of
other claims-makers asserting competing claims.37 Sarbin
and Kitsuse provide a somewhat more controversial
perspective of this third focus, defining the task for analysts
as “interpreting and sometimes proposing alternate
constructions.”38 In the parts that follow, this Article
engages in each of these three analytical steps, beginning
with identification of the specific claims and their
supporting rhetoric.
But first a word about the notion of regulation itself is
in order. Even accepting the general usefulness of
constructionist analysis, one might still question its value in
evaluating legal scholarship regarding regulation. After all,
few legal scholars would take the position that legal texts
have fixed meanings disconnected from the social context in
which they are created and applied.39 Rather, much
sophisticated legal scholarship takes the indeterminacy of
words as a given, and engages in a normative discourse
about how the words ought to be interpreted, knowing full
well that alternative interpretations exist. Thus, there is no
34. IMAGES, supra note 3, at 348-49.
35. See HANNIGAN, supra note 24, at 63-64; IMAGES, supra note 3, at 337.
36. HANNIGAN, supra note 24, at 64-66 (setting out Best’s approach and
discussing its application by other scholars); IMAGES, supra note 3, at 349-50.
Other commentators have modified Best’s approach, employing a “framing”
perspective. See LOSEKE, supra note 31, at 55-70.
37. IMAGES, supra note 3, at 350-51.
38. CONSTRUCTING THE SOCIAL, supra note 4, at x.
39. See Rubin, supra note 16, at 1858 (noting that most legal scholars do not
view legal text as “sources of inherent meaning”).
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“taken-as-granted,” broad acceptance of a particular
scholar’s interpretation as the proper reading of a legal text.
This argument suffers from two distinct flaws. First, it
mistakenly assumes that social construction only occurs
where there is uncontested, unthinking acceptance of the
constructed “fact.” To the contrary, constructionist social
problems theory recognizes that alternative constructions of
putative problems often exist, competing in the social arena
for acceptance and institutional response.40 Second, the
argument limits the concept of regulation to the legal text.
As the next part of this Article demonstrates, while the text
certainly plays a part (albeit a surprisingly small one) in
claims-making by legal scholars, that claims-making
concentrates as much on the law in action as the law in the
books, and perhaps more. In other words, the social
construction of regulation is mostly about shared
perceptions concerning the actions, interactions, and
capacities of the regulators and the regulated. Using a
variety of techniques, legal scholars have cast these
perceptions as empirically-based factual depictions.
II. CONSTRUCTION BY LEGAL SCHOLARS: IDENTIFYING THE
CLAIMS
My thesis is that a fairly well-accepted view of the
structure and operation of “command and control
regulation” has spread through the legal academy over
time. This view, which identifies traditional regulation as a
social problem in need of reform, is the product of claimsmaking activities by legal scholars. Though articulated in a
variety of ways, their essential claim is that traditional
regulation inappropriately displaces “local” private
management of pollution with centralized, government
decision making. The diverse range of solutions offered for
this putative problem share a common theme: regulation
should become substantially less directive, affording
businesses greater freedom of action in managing pollution
subject to performance-based constraints.
This study examines the claims-making activities as
reflected in law review articles.41 Clearly legal scholars
40. GÓMEZ, supra note 24, at 6; HANNIGAN, supra note 24, at 74-75.
41. See IMAGES, supra note 3, at 350 (identifying “scholarly and professional
books and periodical articles” as sources of claims); Edelman et al., supra note 2,
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advance their claims through other means as well, including
conference presentations, testimony, casebooks, teaching,
and informal interactions. I focus on law review articles
because they presumably reflect the most rigorous, complete
articulation of the claims, and because they are the most
available and comprehensive source for evaluation, coding
and tracking of the claims through the social network of
scholars.
Claims-making is essentially a rhetorical activity;
claims-makers seek to persuade others that a particular
condition is a social problem requiring a particular
response.42 Recognizing this, Professor Best and others have
applied principles of rhetoric to analyze claims, identifying
three components of claims-making: grounds, warrants, and
conclusions.43 Grounds are statements of the “facts,”
themselves socially constructed knowledge, regarding a
particular problem, including definitions, examples or case
studies, and estimates of the size or scope of the problem.
Warrants are statements offered to justify drawing
particular conclusions from the grounds; they bridge the
gap between the identified problem and the need to act.44
Conclusions are the policy prescriptions offered by the
claim-makers.45 In many cases they will take the form of
“new social control policies by existing bureaucratic
institutions.”46
This part uses Professor Best’s approach to describe the
claims-making activities of legal scholars. The reforms
proposed in the legal literature—primarily the adoption of a
at 61 (identifying law review articles as the means through which legal scholars
construct the law).
42. Joel Best, Rhetoric in Claims-Making: Constructing the Missing Children
Problem, 34 SOC. PROBS. 101, 102 (1987).
43. Id. Other commentators have relied upon the rhetoric use of “frames” to
define problems and support solutions. See HANNIGAN, supra note 24, at 64-65;
Taylor, supra note 26, at 510-16.
44. HANNIGAN, supra note 24, at 64; Best, supra note 42, at 109-12. In his
examination of the professional literature on elder abuse, Baumann identified
similar warrants, the vulnerable and dependant nature of the elderly, and the
sanctity of life. Eleen A. Baumann, Research Rhetoric and the Social
Construction of Elder Abuse, in IMAGES, supra note 3, at 55, 63-66.
45. Best, supra note 42, at 112.
46. HANNIGAN, supra note 24, at 65.
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variety of “market-based” regulatory tools such as emissions
trading,
information
disclosure
and
contractual
regulation47—are well known and widely-debated on their
own terms. I am more interested in how legal scholarship
has so resolutely determined that reform is necessary, and
that the nature of that reform should be tied so closely to
neoclassical economic theory. Accordingly, this part focuses
on aspects of claims-making that have drawn significantly
less express attention than the conclusions—namely, the
grounds and warrants utilized by legal scholars in law
review publications.
A. Grounds for the Problem
As noted above, the grounds of a claim are statements of
the problem, consisting of definitions, examples or case
studies, and estimates. Broadly stated, the conventional
construction casts “command and control” regulation as a
top-down, heavily prescriptive system that both
undervalues and heavily constrains decision making by
businesses. As one might expect, legal scholars articulate
this view in a variety of ways. Nonetheless, this diverse set
of characterizations can be distilled down to three basic
propositions that are used individually or in combination to
define the “problem.” Taken individually and together,
these three propositions form the underlying basis of
widespread criticism of this form of regulation. They also
provide guideposts for reform, as legal scholars search for
regulatory alternatives that avoid the deficiencies
highlighted by the three propositions. Scholars advocating
these propositions make use of examples, case studies, and
estimates as support.
The first proposition, the rigidity proposition, focuses on
the core structure of traditional regulation—that is, the
manner in which the substantive standards are articulated.
The rigidity proposition asserts that these substantive
standards unnecessarily limit the regulated firms’ range of
options in reducing pollution. Generally speaking,
regulatory standards can be structured either as “design
47. See Jody Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 155, 189197 (2000) (discussing contractual regulation); Kenneth R. Richards, Framing
Environmental Policy Instrument Choice, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 221, 230
(2000) (providing a taxonomy of various instruments).
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standards” or “performance standards.” A design standard
requires the facility to use a specific type of equipment or
work practice to control emission. A performance standard
instead sets an emission rate or other measure of
performance to be attained, leaving it to the regulated
entity to select the particular technology or work practice. A
performance standard may be health-based (established by
reference to the expected public health impacts of the
standard) or technology-based (set by reference to the
expected performance of a particular technology).48
This rigidity proposition itself takes several forms. The
strong form broadly states that command and control
regulation requires firms to use specific control technologies
or operational practices.49 The moderate form recognizes
some variability in the structure of command and control
regulation, claiming that regulation often, or at least
sometimes, uses design standards.50 The functional form is
perhaps the most nuanced of the three. It acknowledges
that as written, most command and control standards are
structured as performance standards. However, it contends
that this theoretical flexibility is lost in practice because
firms are pressured to adopt the underlying reference
technology on which the performance standard had been
based.51

48. Timothy F. Malloy & Peter Sinsheimer, Innovation, Regulation and the
Selection Environment, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 183, 183-84 (2004).
49. See Lisa Heinzerling, Selling Pollution, Forcing Democracy, 14 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 300, 302 (1995) (“In a command-and-control system, the government
dictates the technology that must be installed to control pollution . . .”); Cass R.
Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 1019 (1995) (“[A]ll
industries must adopt the same control technology . . .”).
50. See, e.g., James E. Krier, Marketable Pollution Allowances, 25 TOL. L.
REV. 449, 451 (1994) (“Under [command and control regulation], sources are told
how much they must control or what devices they must install.”); Bradford C.
Mank, The Environmental Protection Agency’s Project XL and Other Regulatory
Reform Initiatives: The Need for Legislative Authorization, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1,
31 n.159 (1998) (“Congress . . . often specified technology-based pollution
controls . . . .”).
51. See Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Marketable Permits: Lessons for
Theory and Practice, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 361, 361 (1989) (“In many cases,
regulatory authorities issued standards effectively specifying the actual
technology that was required to achieve compliance.”).
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The second proposition focuses on whether the
government differentiates among firms in setting its
standards. The homogeneity proposition states that
traditional regulation applies a one-size-fits-all approach
that fails to distinguish among firms in terms of their
economic, technological, or organizational capacities to
reduce emissions.52 Although the homogeneity and rigidity
propositions are often conflated, they are actually distinct
components of the mainstream construction. Thus, a
regulation could be rigid in its imposition of technology
requirements, yet still recognize differences across firms.
For example, the EPA could identify several different
categories of firms within a single industrial sector,
imposing rigid but dissimilar standards on each category.
Nonetheless, the two propositions are related to one
another. As rigidity increases, the negative impact of
homogenous regulation intensifies because firms are less
and less able deploy alternatives approaches.
The third proposition, the competency proposition,
consists of two prongs, each focused on the respective
capacities of government and industry. First, it posits that
individual firms have greater access than government to
information
regarding
pollution
generation
and
management.53 Second, it holds that individual firms are
better able to develop and implement pollution management
strategies than a centralized government agency.54
52. See Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental
Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1335 (1985) (“Uniform BAT requirements waste
many billions of dollars annually by ignoring variations among plants and
industries in the cost of reducing pollution and by ignoring geographic
variations in pollution effects.”); Daniel J. Fiorino, Toward a New System of
Environmental Regulation: The Case for an Industry Sector Approach, 26
ENVTL. L. 457, 469 (1996) (“The economic and technological feasibility of
pollution prevention requirements vary substantially by firm size or type of
operation.”).
53. See Richard B. Stewart, Madison’s Nightmare, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 335, 343
(1990) (“Bureaucrats in Washington simply cannot gather and process the vast
amount of information needed to tailor regulations to the nation’s many
variations in circumstances and the constant changes in relevant conditions.”);
Cass R. Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 407, 420
(1990) (“Government is rarely in a good position to know what sorts of
innovations are likely to be forthcoming; industry will have a huge comparative
advantage here.”).
54. See, e.g., Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 52, at 1343 (“Instead of giving
the job of economic and technological assessment to bureaucrats, the
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Government decision making is characterized as slow,
unresponsive, and politicized, while firm decision making is
seen as efficient, nimble, and objective.55
In defining command and control regulation through
these three propositions, legal scholars make use of two
major tools identified by Professor Best: examples or case
studies and estimates of the size or scope of the problem.56
Two types of examples and case studies are most
prevalent.57 First, many scholars rely upon generic
references to various sections of federal statutes with little
or no discussion of the specifics of those sections.58 Second, a
number of articles directly or indirectly reference Clean
Coal/Dirty Air, Professors Ackerman and Hassler’s classic
case study of an early air quality regulation covering coal-

marketable rights mechanism would put the information-processing burden
precisely where it belongs: upon business managers and engineers who are in
the best position to figure out how to cut back on their plants’ pollution costs.”).
55. See, e.g., David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive
Program?: Replacing the Command and Control/Economic Incentive Dichotomy,
55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 289, 297 (1998) (“[T]he polluter knows its facility better
than the regulator and can determine how to deliver any given decrease in
pollution more efficiently than the regulator.”); Richard B. Stewart, Models for
Environmental Regulation: Central Planning Versus Market-Based Approaches,
19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 547, 552 (1992) (“[A] technology-based approach
requires a large centralized government bureaucracy to study industries and
choose technologies. Decisions are slow, unresponsive, and costly. Because of the
problems in gathering and processing information in a control bureaucracy, the
standards produced are often inappropriate to local circumstances or
obsolescent.”).
56. IMAGES, supra note 3, at 189.
57. To a lesser degree, some scholars use generic examples of types of
industries to support the homogeneity and competency propositions. See Fiorino,
supra note 52, at 469 (batch processing within the chemical industry);
Karkkainen, supra note 5, at 267 (farming, energy generation, and steel
production). Also, some scholars reference surveys or modeling of pollution
control costs across industrial plants to support claims regarding the
homogeneity proposition. See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 52, at 1335-36.
58. See Heinzerling, supra note 49, at 304 (rigidity proposition); Richards,
supra note 47, at 239 (rigidity proposition); Richard B. Stewart, The Discontents
of Legalism: Interest Group Relations in Administrative Regulation, 1985 WIS. L.
REV. 655, 670-71 (homogeneity proposition); James T.B. Tripp & Daniel J.
Dudek, Institutional Guidelines for Designing Successful Transferable Rights
Programs, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 369, 369 (1989) (homogeneity proposition).
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fired power plants59 to support one or more of the
propositions.60
Scholars establishing grounds for the competency
proposition often use estimates to emphasize the
overwhelming scope of the task facing the regulatory
agency, positing that the sheer volume of information to be
processed is beyond the capacity of government.61 Scholars
also use such estimates to describe the scope of the rigidity
proposition, pointing out the astounding jurisdictional reach
of the design standards.62 Some articles stress the number of
regulated entities, while others focus on the volume and
complexity of the regulations. For example, Professors
Pildes and Sunstein offer the image of a federal government
attempting to collect, synthesize and act upon information
relating to “hundreds, thousands, or millions of companies
and individuals in an exceptionally diverse nation.”63
Taken individually and together, therefore, these three
propositions form the core of the conventional construction
of traditional regulation. Using examples, case studies,
surveys,
and
estimates—combined
with viscerally
compelling analogies to central economic planning—
scholars have thus established the grounds for this
construction. By linking the propositions to warrants for
reform, scholars advance their claims of the need for reform.
59. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR
(1981).
60. See David R. Allardice et al., Industry Approaches to Environmental
Policy in the Great Lakes Region, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 357, 363 (1994) (rigidity and
homogeneity propositions); Gary E. Marchant, Freezing Carbon Dioxide
Emissions: An Offset Policy for Slowing Global Warming, 22 ENVTL. L. 623, 629
(1992) (rigidity proposition); Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing
the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 98 (1995) (rigidity and homogeneity
propositions)
61. See T.H. TIETENBERG, EMISSIONS TRADING: AN EXERCISE IN REFORMING
POLLUTION POLICY 14-16 (1985) (referring to 27,000 major stationary sources);
Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The
Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171, 174 (1988)
(“[Regulation] involves . . . controls on hundreds of thousands of pollution
sources.”).
62. See Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 60, at 97.
63. Id.; see also Daniel A. Farber, Environmental Protection as a Learning
Experience, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 791, 794 (1994) (referring to enormous rulemaking records consisting of “tens of thousands of pages”).
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Before turning to the warrants for reform, however, a
caveat is in order. My description of these propositions is
both a summary and synthesis of 135 articles.64 As such, it
necessarily sacrifices finer grained resolution for a broader
view of the literature’s essential features. The discussion of
the rigidity proposition is a case in point. While I identified
only three forms of the proposition, other variations on the
notion of rigidity are likewise nestled within the articles.
For example, Professor Stewart and others have focused on
what Professor Driesen called “spatial specificity,” in which
the mandated emission reduction must occur at a specified
emission point at the facility from a particular piece of
equipment or process, rather than from other points within
the facility or from other facilities.65 I leave this type of
rigidity as well as other putative features of the
conventional construction to the side because they have not
been prominently deployed by scholars in their collective
indictment of traditional regulation.66
B. Warrants for Reform
Warrants are statements used by the claims-makers to
justify drawing particular conclusions from the grounds
presented, creating the inferential bridge between the two.67
64. Indeed, the foregoing analysis is itself an exercise in social construction.
65. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 52, at 1341-42; Driesen, supra note 55,
at 303. Imagine a manufacturing facility that has four industrial boilers
emitting tons of NOx. Now suppose that the regulation establishes a NOx
emission limit for such boilers which allows the facility to select the best means
of reducing emissions at any given boiler, be it alternate fuels, low NOx burners,
scrubbers or something else. Such regulation would be inconsistent with the
rigidity proposition as I use the term. Nonetheless, that regulation would still
exhibit spatial specificity if it precludes the facility from complying with the
emission standard at one boiler through some form of trading, either by overcontrolling emissions at one of the other three boilers or by relying upon overcontrol at boilers or other emission sources at other locations.
66. In the seminal work in this area, Ackerman and Stewart focused on this
type of rigidity, observing that it unnecessarily increased the costs of regulation
by preventing allocation of the emissions reductions obligation to those firms
having the lowest reduction costs. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 52, at 134142. Reasonable minds can differ on the extent to which traditional regulation
historically incorporated trading approaches, on the technical and
administrative constraints on its use, and on its expected costs and benefits.
67. HANNIGAN, supra note 24, at 64; Best, supra note 42, at 108.
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In practice, warrants create such bridges by explicitly or
implicitly appealing to particular values of importance to
the audience.68 For example, in his analysis of claimsmaking regarding missing children, Professor Best
identified six prominent value-infused warrants, including
the inherent value of children, the blameless nature of the
victims, and the right to personal freedom and happiness.69
Of the variety of warrants that legal scholars deploy in
seeking regulatory reform, two stand out: achieving
economic efficiency and encouraging technological
innovation.70 This section briefly addresses each in turn.
The economic efficiency warrant is the most widely used
justification for reform.71 Advancing principles of the free
market and minimal government intervention, this warrant
calls for economically efficient regulation—that is,
regulation that optimizes the social benefits of pollution
reduction while minimizing the costs of such reduction to

68. See Best, supra note 42, at 108; S. Michelle Driedger & John Eyles,
Organochlorines and Breast Cancer: The Uses of Scientific Evidence in
Claimsmaking, 52 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1589, 1591 (2001).
69. Best, supra note 42, at 109-12; see also E.A. Baumann, supra note 44, at
63-65 (identifying warrants from professional literature on elder abuse).
70. See Mark A. Stach, The Gradual Reform of Environmental Law in the
Twenty-First Century: Opportunities Within a Familiar Framework, 22 J. CORP.
L. 621, 626-28 (1997); Sunstein, supra note 5, at 634-40. Other warrants include
reducing complexity, minimizing moral hazards associated with agency capture
by industry and rent-seeking by powerful agencies, and promoting democratic
decision making. See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 61, at 189-90; Eric W.
Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1237-40 (1995)
(describing the “juridification” of environmental regulation and the problem of
moral hazard); Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management
Strategies for Common Resources, 1991 DUKE L.J. 1, 1. See infra notes 71-83
and accompanying text for discussion of the full range of warrants used in the
regulatory literature.
71. See Jonathan H. Adler, The Ducks Stop Here? The Environmental
Challenge to Federalism, 9 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 205, 226 (2001) (noting the
inefficient allocation of costs); Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, IncentiveBased Environmental Regulation: A New Era from an Old Idea? 18 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 1, 6 (1991); Stach, supra note 70, at 626 (identifying inefficiency as a major
reproach of command and control regulation); Richard B. Stewart, A New
Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 31 (2001);
Sunstein, supra note 49, at 1019; Gerald Torres, Who Owns the Sky?, 19 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 515, 561 (2002).

290

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

industry and the economy generally.72 Pursuing economic
efficiency requires attention to how and by whom the
reductions are achieved. In particular, the reductions
should be made by the companies who can do so at the
lowest cost.73 Many legal academics consistently claim that
command and control is “wildly inefficient,”74 and that
alternative regulatory schemes based upon market
principles would result in efficient regulation.75
Scholars link the economic inefficiency warrant to the
three propositions in a variety of ways. In some cases, they
focus primarily on a single proposition at a time. For
example, Professor Adler ties inefficiency to the
homogeneity proposition, observing that:
Mandating the use of a given technology or even imposing
percentage emission reductions on a given industry may produce
widely divergent costs across firms. Some firms will find it less
expensive to reduce emissions through some means other than
that mandated by law, perhaps by making different modifications
to the production process.76

He has much company among legal scholars on this
point.77 Likewise, Mark Stach singles out the competency
proposition as one leading cause of inefficiency, noting that
“[o]ne reason for such inefficiency is that regulations,
crafted by bureaucrats, are substituted for the judgment

72. See Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, When is Command-and-Control
Efficient? Institutions, Technology, and the Comparative Efficiency of Alternative
Regulatory Regimes for Environmental Protection, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 887, 893
(“The nominal efficiency of a regulatory regime is determined by comparing its
social costs and benefits; the regime is nominally efficient if it produces benefits
in excess of its costs.”).
73. Id.
74. Orts, supra note 70, at 1236 (“wildly inefficient” or even “irrational”);
Sunstein, supra note 5, at 628 (“wildly inefficient”).
75. Sunstein, supra note 5, at 628.
76. Adler, supra note 71, at 226.
77. See Adam Chase, The Efficiency Benefits of “Green Taxes”: A Tribute to
Senator John Heinz, 11 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 14 (1992); Hahn &
Stavins, supra note 71, at 6 (homogeneity); Richard J. Lazarus, Debunking
Environmental Feudalism: Promoting the Individual Through the Collective
Pursuit of Environmental Quality, 77 IOWA L. REV. 1739, 1771 (1992).
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and experience of those within the industry who are
intimately familiar with the business.”78
In other cases, scholars connect the propositions. For
example, Professor Stewart links the homogeneity and
competency propositions, arguing that an agency’s decision
making limitations lead it to adopt uniform, inefficient
requirements.79 Other scholars couple the rigidity
proposition with the competency proposition in challenging
command and control regulation as inefficient, arguing that
by mandating a particular technology, government
regulators may unwittingly bar the use of a cheaper
approach unknown to them but identifiable by individual
facilities.80
Quite apart from their view of the importance of
efficiency, virtually every legal scholar recognizes the
advancement of technological innovation as critical to
effective regulation.81 Innovation in pollution management
approaches can substantially reduce the costs associated
with current regulatory programs and also allows policy to
keep pace with new environmental challenges that
inevitably arise with economic and technological expansion
over time.82 Most legal academics claim that command and
control regulation impedes innovation, using the warrant of
encouraging technological innovation to justify reform.83

78. Stach, supra note 70, at 626. As with the homogeneity proposition, Stach
finds significant support for this warrant among other scholars. See Adler, supra
note 71, at 230-31; Robert W. Hahn & Albert M. McGartland, The Political
Economy of Instrument Choice: An Examination of the U.S. Role in
Implementing the Montreal Protocol, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 592, 600 (1989); Jon D.
Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of
Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1556 (1999).
79. Stewart, supra note 71, at 31; see also Stewart, supra note 58, at 670-71.
80. See Karkkainen, supra note 5, at 270; Marchant, supra note 60, at 62931.
81. See Malloy & Sinsheimer, supra note 48, at 184-85.
82. Id.; see also Stewart, supra note 5, at 1260-61.
83. See, e.g., Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 52, at 1334-51; Daniel J.
Dudek & John Palmisano, Emissions Trading: Why is This Thoroughbred
Hobbled?, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 217, 222-36 (1988); Richard B. Stewart,
Environmental Regulation and International Competitiveness, 102 YALE L.J.
2039, 2095 (1993).
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Here again, each of the three propositions are
implicated. Some scholars focus on the rigidity proposition,
emphasizing the notion that design standards (or their
functional equivalents) “lock-in” existing technology. So, for
example, Professors Gaines and Westin lament that
“[r]egulation suppresses innovation because it may direct
the use of one technology, or because the difficulties in
using alternative technology favors the reference
technology.”84 Others acknowledge the role of the rigidity
proposition, but concentrate primarily on the institutional
deficiencies of government agencies and the competency
proposition, pointing out the inability of central authorities
to identify and nurture emerging technologies.85 Still, others
tie together the competency and homogeneity propositions.86
This, then, is the basic shape of the conventional
construction, defined by one or more of three central
propositions, supported by examples, case studies, and
estimates, and drawing persuasive weight from the
warrants of economic efficiency and technological
innovation. But what is the source of this construction, both
in terms of the social network that created it and the
empirical evidence that supports it? Part III takes up that
question.

84. See ASBJÖRN ERIKSSON ET AL., TAXATION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
4 (Sanford E. Gaines & Richard A. Westin eds., 1991); see also NEIL
GUNNINGHAM ET AL., SMART REGULATION: DESIGNING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 39
n.5 (1998) (“[A]gency [technology] guidance becomes de facto requirement and
technological lock-in occurs.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional
Moments, and the Cost-Benefit State, 48 STAN. L. REV. 247, 260 (1996) (control
technology mandates provide little incentive for innovation).
85. See Jonathan Remy Nash, Too Much Market? Conflict between Tradable
Pollution Allowances and the “Polluter Pays” Principle, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
465, 528 (2000); see also David W. Case, The EPA’s Environmental Stewardship
Initiative: Attempting to Revitalize a Floundering Regulatory Reform Agenda, 50
EMORY L.J. 1, 29 (2001) (“[Command and control regulation] unwisely requires
regulators to make business and operating decisions that could be made more
efficiently, effectively and competently by regulated industry.”).
86. See Karkkainen, supra note 5, at 269 (“Unable to set source-specific
standards, the regulator typically decides on the best available technology for an
entire category of sources. . . . Because the regulator cannot anticipate the future
trajectory of technological change, the standard may freeze in place those
technologies “available” at the time the regulation is promulgated.”).

2010]

SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION

293

III. MAPPING THE CONVENTIONAL CONSTRUCTION
This part addresses two questions. First, is there a
generally accepted conventional construction of command
and control regulation within the legal literature? If so, is
the conventional construction as presented by the claimsmakers based upon empirical evidence? To answer these
questions, Part III examines data from 135 law review
articles and books that deal substantively with command
and control regulation. But first, it provides a brief
description of the bibliometric methodology used.
Bibliometrics is the collection and analysis of data
regarding written communication “to shed light on . . . the
nature and course of development of a discipline.”87 Citation
analysis, which typically examines citation patterns by
researchers within a particular field, is one of the most
common
bibliometric
techniques.88
Communications
researchers typically use citation analysis to investigate
scholar communication89—that is, the manner in which
87. Alan Pritchard, Statistical Bibliography or Bibliometrics?, 25 J.
DOCUMENTATION 348, 348 (1969); see also Christine L. Borgman, Editor’s
Introduction to SCHOLARLY COMMUNICATION AND BIBLIOMETRICS 10, 13 (Christine
L. Borgman ed., 1990).
88. See Leah A. Lievrouw, Reconciling Structure and Process in the Study of
Scholarly Communication, in SCHOLARLY COMMUNICATION AND BIBLIOMETRICS,
supra note 87, at 59, 60-61 (discussing citation analysis). In the law, citation
analysis has been used primarily to identify the frequency of citation of
particular authors, articles, or faculties. See Fred R. Shapiro, Origins of
Bibliometrics, Citation Indexing, and Citation Analysis: The Neglected Legal
Literature, 43 J. AM. SOC’Y INFO. SCI. 337 (1992); Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited
Law Review Articles, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1540 (1985). There has been less research
in the legal literature or elsewhere regarding citation practices of legal scholars.
Richard Delgado’s work contending that established male, white legal scholars
excluded minority scholars from the discourse on civil rights issues is a
significant exception. See Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar Revisited: How
to Marginalize Outsider Writing, Ten Years Later, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1349
(1992); Richard Delgado, Commentary, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a
Review of Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561 (1984); Symposium on
Trends in Legal Citations and Scholarship, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 909 (1996).
89. See Borgman, supra note 87, at 13. One of the most common forms is cocitation analysis, which maps connections between individual authors (in
“author co-citation analysis”) and articles (in “document co-citation analysis”)
based on their joint citation by other authors. Howard D. White, Author CoCitation Analysis: Overview and Defense, in SCHOLARLY COMMUNICATION AND
BIBLIOMETRICS, supra note 87, at 84, 85.
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scholars “use and disseminate information through formal
and informal channels.”90 In particular, assorted types of
citation analysis are often used to delineate the boundaries
of various scientific disciplines or to trace the spread of a
particular idea within a discipline.
This Article uses citation analysis to track the
treatment of the three propositions by legal scholars over
time. In particular, it performs content analysis, a
technique in which the manifest content of a communication
is described in a systematic way.91 For each law review
article reviewed in this study, the content analysis focused
on four factors. First, it determined what position, if any,
the author took on each of the three propositions. Second, it
identified any other legal scholars cited with respect to the
proposition in question, and characterized the citation as
positive (i.e., the author agreed with the cited work),
negative, or neutral. Third, it tracked the types of warrants,
if any, relied upon by scholars to link propositions to
reforms. Last, it determined the nature of the empirical
evidence, if any, used with respect to each proposition. As
the discussion of the results demonstrates, this type of
content analysis permits quantification of the strength of
the conventional construction, and identification of subgroups of scholars who reject that construction.
This analysis proceeded in stages. We began with a pool
of approximately 375 law review articles, reports, and books
published in 1979 through 2002 that discussed the use of
command and control regulation in environmental law.92
90. Borgman, supra note 87, at 13.
91. See William Paisley, The Future of Bibliometrics, in SCHOLARLY
COMMUNICATION AND BIBLIOMETRICS, supra note 87, at 281, 288 (noting that
content analysis includes the translation of survey responses into coded
responses); see also Christine L. Borgman & Jonathan Furner, Scholarly
Communication and Bibliometrics, 36 ANN. R. INFO. SCI. & TECH. 3, 22 (2002)
(describing “citation content analysis” as the examination of the content of
individual links “to determine their function, purpose, role, or meaning”).
92. We began with an initial pool of more than 900 articles using the search
term “command w/5 control and environmental law” in the Lexis database US &
Canadian Law Reviews, Combined. We then excluded articles that focused on
subjects tangential to the evaluation and reform of United States command and
control regulation. In particular, we excluded articles that focused explicitly (as
indicated by their title or introduction) on international law, tort law,
environmental justice, enforcement, securities law, Superfund, and ISO 14000.
This revised initial pool was supplemented with any articles or books that were
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Each article was reviewed to determine how, if at all, it
described command and control regulation. We retained any
article that engaged in a significant, substantive discussion
of command and control regulation, regardless of whether
that discussion reflected the conventional construction. We
removed those articles that did not engage in significant
discussion of the nature or operation of command and
control. Typically, such removed articles described a
regulation as command and control without elaboration.93
Ultimately, 135 articles and books were included in a
database for further citation analysis.94 These works were
produced by 137 authors. In numerous cases the pieces were
coauthored by two or more scholars. Some authors were
quite prolific; for example, Professor Stewart had fifteen
individual and coauthored pieces in the database. Many
other authors had only one article or book in the database.
Traditionally, citation analysis has made two critical
assumptions about the act of citing another scholar’s work.
First, it assumes that the citing researcher actually used or
relied upon the research underlying the cited work, as
opposed to finding and citing it as an afterthought.95 Second,
it generally assumes that the cited article was singled out
for use, and ultimately citation, because of its merit and
substantive relevance.96 Studies of citation practices in the
cited by an article in the pool (a “citing article”) or by an article or book which
itself had been added to the revised initial pool because of citation by an article
in the pool.
93. See, e.g., David B. Spence, Paradox Lost: Logic, Morality, and the
Foundations of Environmental Law in the 21st century, 20 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
145, 175 (1995) (mentioning command and control without engaging in any
evaluation or critique); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 903, 955 (1996) (making passing reference to command and
control regulation).
94. My research assistant, Renee Floyd, deserves much credit and sympathy
for her tireless efforts with respect to this laborious, and at times, mindnumbing review.
95. Sydney J. Pierce, Disciplinary Work and Interdisciplinary Areas:
Sociology and Bibliometrics, in SCHOLARLY COMMUNICATION AND BIBLIOMETRICS,
supra note 87, at 46, 48. For a refreshingly funny but nonetheless insightful
look at citation practices and motives in the legal academy, see J.M. Balkin &
Sanford Levinson, How to Win Cites and Influence People, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
843 (1996).
96. See Pierce, supra note 95, at 48.

296

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

sciences suggest that the act of citing is a more complex
cognitive and social act than these two assumptions reflect.
An individual researcher likely has a mix of motives in
selecting particular authors or works for citation, which
could include the persuasiveness and relevance of the cited
work, but also could include uncritical, ritualistic
acknowledgement of “classics” or pandering to friends.97
Thus, one must be cautious in ascribing particular meaning
to citation choices in any single case. Nonetheless, there is
good reason to believe that citation analysis can provide
insight into the source, diffusion, and importance of certain
concepts.98
A. In Search of the Convention Construction
There is no standard test or criteria for demonstrating
the existence of a particular social construction. I adopt a
functional approach grounded in the basic definition of
claims-making: Is there meaningful reliance upon the basic
propositions and warrants underlying the putative
construction within the relevant community? For these
purposes I define the notion of relevant community as the
population of legal scholars who have been actively engaged
in the debate regarding the appropriate design of
substantive regulation. That population is the group of
almost 140 authors whose articles were included in the
database; the criterion for inclusion in the database was
97. See Terrence A. Brooks, Evidence of Complex Citer Motivations, 37 J. AM.
SOC’Y INFO. SCI. 34 (1986). For assessments in the legal literature based more on
intuition, see Balkin & Levinson, supra note 95, at 843; and Richard S.
Markovits, The Professional Assessment of Legal Academics: On the Shift from
Evaluator Judgment to Market Evaluations, 48 J. LEGAL EDUC. 417, 423-24
(1998) who writes:
Since many frequently cited articles are cited because they contain succinct statements of boilerplate propositions of law or of a particular
academic approach to some set of issues, or because they fall squarely
within a particular academic paradigm whose proponents make a practice of citing each other, the frequency of an author’s citations has little
to do with his influence, much less with the quality of his work.
98. See Janet Beavin Bavelas, The Social Psychology of Citations, 19 CAN.
PSYCHOL. REV. 158, 161 (1978) (noting with caveats that citations used to
support the citer’s credibility still reflect some level of scholarly impact of the
cited source); White, supra note 89, at 90-92.
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engagement “in substantive discussion of command and
control regulation.”99
One could argue that acceptance of the propositions and
warrants by a broader audience—such as policymakers or
scholars outside the defined population—is needed to
establish the ascendancy of a socially constructed problem.
The more limited focus here is justified on two grounds.
First, I am most interested in how legal scholars’
construction of a problem constrains the scope of the debate,
and the range of potential reforms, within the legal
literature. Accordingly, it is the claims-making—rather
than the ultimate institutional response—that is of most
relevance. In this regard, my definition is consistent with
the constructionist approach to social problems, which itself
directs substantial attention to the activities of the claimsmakers, rather than the reactions of the broader audience of
policymakers.100 Second, concentration on the engaged legal
scholars and their written product provides a practical and
tractable framework for analysis.
Clearly, this functional approach is a largely qualitative
exercise. I do not offer definitive proof of the existence of the
conventional construction. Nonetheless, two sets of evidence
support the conclusion that the conventional construction is
present in legal scholarship. First, as an absolute and
relative matter, the majority of legal scholars have adopted
one or more of the three propositions, albeit to differing
degrees. Second, each of those scholars has also linked one
or more of the propositions to a common set of warrants for
reform, demonstrating claims-making in action.
1. Defining the Social Problem: Adoption of the
Propositions. There appears to be relatively broad adoption
of the propositions in the relevant population of scholars.
Table 1 focuses upon the individual propositions,
identifying the respective number and percentage 101 of the
99. See supra p. 295.
100. See IMAGES, supra note 3, at 6 (“Constructionists examine what
claimsmakers say about conditions . . . .”). Some theorists have extended the
analysis to consider “audience.” See GÓMEZ, supra note 24, at 7-8
(institutionalization in a study of prenatal drug exposure policies); Hilgartner &
Bosk, supra note 24 (using a public arena model to examine the outcome
between competing constructions).
101. Of the 137 authors, nineteen were characterized as neutral, meaning that
they either did not discuss any of the three propositions, or did not directly or
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137 scholars who either supported or rejected each of the
propositions.102
Table 1
Scholar Support/Rejection by Proposition
Rigidity
Proposition

Homogeneity
Proposition

Competency
Proposition

Number
(%) of
Scholars
Supporting

71 (52%)

34 (25%)

43 (31%)

Number
(%) of
Scholars
Rejecting

30 (22%)

4 (3%)

2 (1%)

This table demonstrates that the rigidity proposition is
the most widely accepted of the three—slightly more than
half of the engaged scholars have adopted it. Ironically, it is
also the most contested proposition, with almost 20% of the
scholars rejecting it. With acceptance rates of 24% and 31%,
respectively, the homogeneity and competency propositions
likewise find significant support among engaged scholars,
with almost no opposition.
Table 2 turns to the depth of support for the
propositions as a set. It sets out the respective numbers of
the 137 scholars who either supported or rejected one or
more of the three basic propositions of the conventional
construction.103

indirectly take a position with respect to any of the three. In calculating the
percentages in Tables 1 and 2, the full 137 authors were considered.
102. Please note that because individual scholars could support or reject one
or more different propositions, scholars could appear in more than one cell of the
table.
103. Here again, one scholar can appear in more than a single cell. For
example, a scholar adopting all three propositions would appear in each of the
three cells in the first row of the table.
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Table 2
Scholar Support/Rejection
by Proposition Sets
At Least One
Proposition

At Least Two
Propositions

Three
Propositions

Number (%)
of Scholars
Supporting

101 (74%)

38 (28%)

9 (7%)

Number (%)
of Scholars
Rejecting

31 (23%)

4 (3%)

0 (0%)

As Table 2 indicates, a substantial majority of the 137
scholars writing in this area adopted at least one of the
propositions, typically the rigidity proposition. A significant
number of engaged scholars supported at least two of the
propositions, while a core group of nine academics embraced
all three propositions. That is not to say that the
propositions are without opposition. Nonetheless, the
number of scholars promoting at least one proposition is
more than three times larger than the number rejecting at
least one. Moreover, nine times as many scholars support at
least two propositions as rebuff at least two.
While the data presented in these tables reflects
relatively significant diffusion of the three propositions
within the community of scholars, the evidence is of course
not conclusive. For example, while there is strong support
for the rigidity proposition in particular, there is also
meaningful opposition. Given such opposition, one could
argue that the proposition has not achieved the “taken as
granted” status associated with socially constructed facts or
concepts. Such an argument, however, mistakenly assumes
that constructionist theory views complete or near complete
consensus as a necessary precondition to social
construction. To the contrary, the constructionist social
problems literature fully expects that competing
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constructions will often be present in the social arena.104
Moreover, opposition to the rigidity proposition is not
tantamount to rejection of the conventional construction
more broadly. Fully one third of those scholars that rejected
the rigidity proposition otherwise embraced the competency
proposition, the homogeneity proposition, or both.105
Putting aside opposition to the rigidity proposition, one
might also challenge the notion of a conventional
construction by pointing to the apparent lack of broadbased, affirmative support for the three propositions as a
set. While almost three quarters of all engaged scholars
expressly embrace at least one proposition, only 28% of
scholars actively support two propositions, and fewer than
10% accept all three.106 Clearly, some scholars have focused
on one proposition or another in making the case for
regulatory reform, while others have developed a more
textured depiction of command and control regulation. Here
again, social problems theory would expect such differences
in framing the definition of the “social problem” by claimsmakers seeking reform.
Indeed, although groups of scholars focused on different
configurations of the three propositions, they were
remarkably consistent across groups in their use of
warrants for reform. We looked at the warrants used by
three groups of scholars: those adopting one, two, or three
propositions, respectively. Table 3 identifies the warrants
relied upon in each of the three groups in rank order:

104. See CONSTRUCTING THE SOCIAL, supra note 4, at x (acknowledging the
existence of competing constructions); IMAGES, supra note 3, at 350.
105. Ten of the twenty-seven scholars who rejected the rigidity proposition
embraced one or both of the other two propositions.
106. See supra p. 298 tbl. 1.
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Table 3
Warrant Use by Group
Warrant Use by
Authors Adopting Only
One Proposition
Warrant

Authors
(n=63)

Warrant Use by
Authors Adopting
Two Propositions
Warrant

Warrant Use by
Authors Adopting
Three Propositions

Authors
(n=29)

Warrant

Authors
(n=9)

Inefficient107

31

Inefficient

17

Inefficient

9

Inhibit
Innovation108

14

Inhibit
Innovation

9

Inhibit
Innovation

7

Ignore Local
Conditions109

4

Ignore
Local
Conditions

5

Delay

5

Delay110

3

Delay

2

Ignore
Local
Conditions

4

Other111

4

Other112

6

Other113

9

The authors in each of these groups relied quite heavily
on the same four warrants in linking their grounds (i.e., the
107. See supra pp. 289-90 for a discussion of the inefficiency warrant.
108. See supra pp. 291-92 for a discussion of the inhibition of innovation
warrant.
109. This refers to the contention that the regulations do not address local
environmental conditions.
110. This refers to the contention that disputes in the rulemaking process and
subsequent litigation create delays in addressing the salient environmental
conditions.
111. They are complexity (1), regulatory capture (1), and bad priority (2).
112. They are complexity (1), regulatory capture (2), undermines democracy
(2), and bad priority (1).
113. They are complexity (3), undermines democracy (2), bad priority (2),
resentment (1), and political overload (1).
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selected propositions and the associated examples,
estimates and case studies) to their recommended
reforms.114 Thus, all of these scholars appear to be engaged
in a common enterprise, relying upon the same group of
warrants to justify regulatory reform.
B. Conventional Construction: Sources and Support
Legal scholars tend to rely upon two types of sources in
supporting their constructions of law: existing scholarship
and empirical evidence.115 While the notion of existing
scholarship is largely self-explanatory, the term “empirical
evidence” could use some elaboration. For these purposes,
the term includes any observed data or information
regarding the structure and operation of the regulatory
system. This includes authoritative documents (e.g.,
statutes and regulations, regulatory history, or case law) as
well as quantitative or qualitative data (such as surveys,
statistical information, or case studies). This section turns
now to the sources of the conventional construction,
beginning with examination of the leaders within the
scholarly network, followed by consideration of the
empirical evidence that they and other network participants
bring to bear.
Concentrating upon the conventional network,
Professors Richard Stewart and Bruce Ackerman stand out
in terms of centrality. Professor Stewart was cited with
approval twenty-eight times by twenty-one different
authors. These citations were to eight of his various articles
and books. Professor Ackerman was a close second, with
three of his pieces being cited favorably a total of twentyfive times by twenty-five separate authors. By far, the most
widely cited article was their coauthored Reforming
Environmental Law.116 Thus to a large degree, their joint
114. It should be noted that not every author relied upon a warrant. For
example, among the sixty-three authors adopting one proposition, twelve did not
rely upon a warrant in supporting a reform.
115. The two are not mutually exclusive. For example, Article 1 may cite
empirical evidence in support of the rigidity proposition. When Article 2 cites
Article 1 for the proposition, it can be said that Article 2 relies upon both
existing scholarship and empirical evidence. As we shall see, because the
existing scholarship makes very little use of empirical evidence, this point is of
little concern in this context.
116. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 52.
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and individual work is the centerpiece of the conventional
construction. No other scholar in this area even approaches
them in terms of citations.117
Their analyses of traditional regulation are
sophisticated and nuanced. For example, their classic
Reforming Environmental Law provides a richly textured
critique of traditional regulation, focusing both on
structural and normative concerns. It also reflects an
appreciation of the subtle aspects of technology-based
regulation. Likewise, Ackerman and Hassler’s Clean
Coal/Dirty Air presents a carefully researched, insightful
examination of the effect of politics and institutional
capacity on the development and implementation of law.118
Not surprisingly, neither Stewart nor Ackerman embrace
the strong form of the rigidity proposition. Instead, in
various articles, Professor Stewart constructs a layered view
of regulation, drawing upon both the moderate and
functional forms of that proposition. He acknowledges that
traditional regulation uses both design and performance
standards, but stresses that in practice administrative
pressures impose constraints on permitting officials and
individual facilities, transforming the performance
standards into de facto design standards.119 For his part,
Professor Ackerman declines to embrace the rigidity
proposition in any of its forms, noting in Clean Coal/Dirty
Air that the Clean Air Act expressly rejects design
standards except in limited circumstances.120 In contrast,

117. Evaluating the significance of a scholar by counting citations is a timehonored tradition in the legal academy and elsewhere. See Lawrence A.
Cunningham, Scholarly Profit Margins: Reflections on the Web, 81 IND. L.J. 271,
273-74 (2006). This Article is unique in that it focused on specific content,
tracing the flow of discrete substantive points through the scholarly network.
118. ACKERMAN & HASSLER, supra note 59.
119. For the functional form, see Stewart, supra note 55, at 550; and Stewart,
supra note 5, at 1268-69. For the moderate form, see Stewart, supra note 83, at
2057, n.79, and Stewart, supra note 53, at 341 (offering use of specific pollution
control technologies as one example of command and control regulation). This
vacillation between forms may be explained by the fact that in the second set of
citations, he was expressly including hazardous waste regulation and workplace
safety rules which, in a number of circumstances, do call for certain types of
management approaches.
120. ACKERMAN & HASSLER, supra note 59, at 18.
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both Ackerman and Stewart endorse the homogeneity and
competency propositions.121
As impressive as their work is, it does not bear the
weight placed on it by the conventional construction.
Consider the rigidity proposition. Although neither scholar
adopts the strong form of that proposition, they are
nonetheless often cited for that very point.122 While this
misplaced reliance raises interesting questions regarding
citation practice more generally,123 it is relevant here
because it undermines the foundation of the strong form of
the rigidity proposition. Scholars seeking authority for the
proposition cite these two central figures in vain, and must
look elsewhere if they hope to establish credible empirical
support. However, as I discuss in detail below and in Part
IV.A, that search for alternative support will be fruitless.124
Moreover, for those propositions which Professors
Stewart and Ackerman do embrace, neither author offers
compelling empirical support. This is not to say that their
scholarship completely lacks any empirically-based
backdrop; Professor Stewart in particular makes skillful use
of case studies, economic modeling, and statutory analysis
to make his case in favor of emerging market-based
121. See, e.g., Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 52, at 1354-57 (adopting both
propositions); Stewart, supra note 53, at 352-56 (adopting both propositions);
Stewart, supra note 71, at 31-33 (adopting homogeneity proposition).
122. See Natalie M. Derzko, Using Intellectual Property Law and Regulatory
Processes to Foster the Innovation and Diffusion of Environmental Technologies,
20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 3, 19 (1996) (citing PETER S. MENELL & RICHARD B.
STEWART, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 374-76 (1994) for the strong form of
proposition 1); Driesen, supra note 55, at 300-01; Evan Goldenberg, The Design
of an Emissions Permit Market for Reclaim: A Holistic Approach, 11 UCLA J.
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 297, 301 (1993) (citing Reforming Environmental Law for the
strong form of proposition 1); Heinzerling, supra note 49 (citing Reforming
Environmental Law for the strong form of proposition 1); Marchant, supra note
60 (citing CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR for the moderate form of proposition 1);
Sunstein, supra note 49 (citing Reforming Environmental Law for the strong
form of proposition 1); Wendy E. Wagner, The Triumph of Technology-Based
Standards, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 83, 90 n.26 (observing that scholars tend to cite
CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR as support for proposition 1).
123. See Heidi Lee Hoerman & Carole Elizabeth Nowicke, Secondary and
Tertiary Citing: A Study of Referencing Behavior in the Literature of Citation
Analysis Deriving from the Ortega Hypothesis of Cole and Cole, 65 LIBR. Q. 415
(1995) (discussing presence of substantive mis-citing in scientific literature).
124. See discussion infra Part IV.A.

2010]

SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION

305

regulation. That said, upon close examination, his evidence
is surprisingly limited, leaving all but narrow slices of the
propositions largely unsupported. The functional form of the
rigidity proposition is illustrative. Here, he provides no
empirical evidence that agency personnel directly or
indirectly pressure entities to select the agency’s reference
technology, or that entities independently choose the
reference technology in order to smooth the permitting
process.125 Indeed, there is not even evidence that a majority
of facilities subject to NSPS or MACT standards actually
choose to install the reference technologies.126 While the
story he tells may feel intuitively plausible, as Part IV.A
demonstrates, it is certainly not the only reasonable story
one could tell about technology choice by regulated
companies.127
The same is largely true with his and Professor
Ackerman’s treatment of the homogeneity proposition. Here
they present a story of uniform standards, standards that
purportedly ignore wide differences between regulated
facilities, including variations in the cost of pollution
abatement.128 In their story, the differential costs of
abatement render uniform command and control regulation

125. See Stewart, supra note 55, at 550; Stewart, supra note 5, at 1269.
126. As I discuss in greater detail below, in a comprehensive 1995 assessment
of traditional regulation, the Office of Technology Assessment concluded that
there were no data supporting the functional form of the rigidity proposition.
OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY TOOLS: A USER’S GUIDE 97
(1995). The OTA report, however, overstates the lack of evidence. See infra pp.
310-11 (discussing Professor LaPierre’s work).
127. In fairness to Professor Stewart, one should note that he does provide
evidence of another type of rigidity, namely, spatial specificity. See supra text
accompanying notes 65-66.
128. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 52, at 1335; Richard B. Stewart, United
States Environmental Regulation: A Failing Paradigm, 15 J.L. & COM. 585, 58788 (1996). They also identify another aspect of homogeneity—what one might
call “impact homogeneity”—which holds that facilities differ in terms of the
environmental quality or character of their surroundings. Ackerman & Stewart,
supra note 52, at 1335 (“Uniform BAT requirements waste many billions of
dollars annually by ignoring variations among plants and industries in the cost
of reducing pollution and by ignoring geographic variations in pollution effects.
A more cost-effective strategy of risk reduction could free enormous resources
for additional pollution reduction or other purposes.” (emphasis added)).
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excessively expensive.129 In several different articles,
Professor Stewart relies heavily for support upon a set of
economic studies described in Thomas Tietenberg’s
Emissions Trading: An Exercise in Reforming Pollution
Policy.130 Yet these studies fall far short of the mark. At the
methodological level, they consist almost exclusively of
economic modeling rather than actual data regarding “onthe-ground” costs of abatement, and fail to account for
monitoring and implementation costs associated with
market-based
approaches.131
Moreover,
Professors
Ackerman and Stewart deploy these studies without
addressing the numerous conflicting economic studies
described by Professors Cole and Grossman.132 Those
conflicting studies indicate that, under circumstances closer
to those actually facing regulators, command and control
regulation can be as or even more efficient than its marketbased competitors.133
Of course, reasonable dispute over the import of
empirical studies is an integral part of the scholarly
enterprise. Yet, even if one accepts the studies relied upon
by Professors Ackerman and Stewart at face value, at best
those studies only show that certain command and control
programs may be more costly than reified market-based
alternatives. What is particularly striking here is that the
studies simply accept without question the basic
assumption underlying the homogeneity proposition—that
command and control regulations apply uniformly without
regard to the characteristics of individual facilities. The
studies essentially assume, as do Professors Ackerman and
Stewart, that such uniformity exists. Accordingly, the
studies tell us little about the source of the purported
economic inefficiency of traditional regulation and nothing
at all about whether such regulation actually treats all
facilities uniformly.
129. See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 52, at 1335; Stewart, supra note
128, at 587-88; Richard B. Stewart, Controlling Environmental Risks Through
Economic Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 153, 156 (1988).
130. TIETENBERG, supra note 61.
131. See Cole & Grossman, supra note 72, at 889-92; see also Driesen, supra
note 55, at 289 (discussing limitations of the studies in Tietenberg’s book).
132. Cole & Grossman, supra note 72.
133. Id. at 889-92.
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Turning to the competency proposition, Professors
Ackerman and Stewart fare even worse. They present no
empirical evidence for this proposition, save a citation to
National Lime Ass’n v. Environmental Protection Agency.134
Professor Stewart relies upon that case in a brief 1996
symposium piece in support the following statement: “EPA
regulation writers face grave difficulties in gathering
information about the diverse circumstances of different
facilities and devising requirements that are responsive to
these different circumstances.”135 National Lime Ass’n is a
curious choice. In that case, the court remanded air quality
regulations for rotary kilns used to produce lime, finding
that the EPA had failed to demonstrate that the standard
was generally achievable across the industry.136 The EPA
had used test data from five facilities to establish the
achievability of the standard without showing that those
facilities were representative of the range of operations
within the industry.137 Contrary to Professor Stewart’s
point, the court concluded that gathering and evaluating
the necessary information regarding representative
facilities was fairly straightforward and quite manageable
and found that the EPA’s failure to do so justified a
remand.138 In fact, following the remand, the EPA collected
additional information from twelve more individual plants,
the industry trade association, and pollution control
equipment vendors, and later issued a revised proposed
rule.139

134. 627 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
135. Stewart, supra note 128, at 587.
136. 627 F.2d at 452-53.
137. Id. at 435.
138. Id. at 454-55.
139. See Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources; Lime
Manufacturing Plants, 47 Fed. Reg. 38,832, 38,835 (proposed Sept. 2, 1982) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (“Information was requested in writing from 14
plants, and 12 responses were received. The Agency also surveyed new or
modified lime plants to determine if process and emission control technology
had changed since the development of standards for lime manufacturing plants.
. . . In addition, EPA sought information from the Industrial Gas Cleaning
Institute (IGCI), a national organization of manufacturers of industrial air
pollution control equipment, from the NLA, and from a review of the technical
literature on lime manufacturing.”).
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Thus, the two central actors in this scholarly network
provide minimal factual support for the conventional
propositions, and citations to their articles accordingly carry
no meaningful empirical weight. A review of the articles by
the other scholars completes the analysis, demonstrating a
pervasive lack of factual support for the conventional
construction. Table 4 sets out the types of evidence
employed in support of each of the three conventional
propositions, including the evidence marshaled by
Professors Ackerman and Stewart.
Table 4
Types of Evidence Used to Support Conventional
Construction

Evidence
Type

Total Uses
of Evidence

No. of Uses of
Evidence
to Support
Rigidity
Proposition

No. of Uses
of Evidence
to Support
Homogeneity
Proposition

No. of Uses
of Evidence
to Support
Competency
Proposition

Case Study:
CLEAN COAL/
DIRTY AIR

2

2

0

0

Economic
Analysis
(Teitenberg;
Crandall)

4

1

3

0

Statute/
Regulation/
Case Law

15

12

2

1

Gov’t Report

1

1

0

0

Total

22

16

5

1

Two aspects of the table are particularly important.
First, proponents of the conventional construction make
surprisingly little use of empirical information. Of the 98
articles making conventional claims, only nineteen purport
to rely upon empirical support. Those nineteen
articles make use of empirical evidence in twenty-two
total instances. Second, close examination of that smaller
set of nineteen articles reveals that for the most part the
cited evidence provides dubious support for the propositions.
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Indeed, only one provides actual evidence for any
proposition.
Turning first to the case study and economic analyses,
the two citations to Professors Ackerman and Hassler’s
Clean Coal/Dirty Air study as support for the rigidity
proposition were misplaced; their study in fact rejected that
proposition.140 Two references to Professor Tietenberg’s
Emissions Trading also require little discussion. As noted
above, those studies were more modeling exercises than
actual evidence of real world effects of regulation, and in
any event, did not go to the essential aspects of the relevant
propositions.141 Lastly, in speaking to the homogeneity
proposition, Professors Hahn and Stavins relied upon
Crandall’s economic study to illustrate the differential costs
between facilities.142 However, no one seriously disputes the
notion that the costs of pollution abatement can vary across
facilities and across industries. The contested aspect of the
homogeneity proposition is whether regulation fails to take
such differences into account. The cited study provides no
support for the latter point.143
The references to statutes and regulations in support of
the conventional propositions likewise need not detain us
long. The bulk of these were generic citations to the Clean
Air Act and Clean Water Act. The authors cited the entire
statute, titles, or sections within the statute, without any
specific identification or discussion of the particular
language relied upon. Such broad incantations do little to
advance the case for the conventional construction. In fact,
the only specific regulatory citation in the sixteen articles
actually cuts against the proposition for which it was cited.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 119-21.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 130-31.
142. Hahn & Stavins, supra note 71, at 6 (citing Robert W. Crandall, The
Political Economy of Clean Air: Practical Constraints on White House Review, in
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY UNDER REAGAN’S EXECUTIVE ORDER 205, 210-15 (V.
Kerry Smith ed., 1984)).
143. Indeed, Crandall’s study cites statistics showing differing incremental
costs of pollution control between new sources and existing sources, as well as
variances across industries. These are exactly the types of differences that
underlie the categorical distinction made between industry sectors and between
facilities within the same sectors in identifying reference technologies. See infra
Part IV.B.
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That article relied upon an air quality regulation for the
synthetic organic manufacturing industry in arguing:
Process, technology, and design standards require, for example,
that machinery be installed, pipes inspected, workers trained,
wastes treated in a prescribed way, reports filed at specified
intervals or following certain events. Regulated entities either
meet these explicit requirements or they do not; the regulators
need not analyze whether the actions satisfy some nebulous policy
goal. This is one reason policy makers rely so extensively on
technology and process requirements to achieve their goals. 144

Ironically, the cited regulation is in fact bursting with
performance standards, rather than technology and process
requirements. For example, Section 40 C.F.R. 113(a)(2)—
which is representative of the wide array of standards set
out in the regulation—allows the facility to choose from
several options in addressing process vent emissions,
including simply ensuring that emissions are reduced by a
specified percentage or mass.145
One must go back to 1977 to uncover effective use of
empirical evidence, in this case, supportive of the functional
form of the rigidity proposition. In his treatment of
technology-forcing regulation, Professor LaPierre posited
that facilities may be strategically selecting EPA reference
technologies to comply with the Clean Water Act so as to
avoid penalties in the event the facilities were unable to
meet the applicable performance standards.146 The factual
predicate for his hypothesis—that facilities “blindly”
selected the reference technologies—was supported by
survey data found in the staff report of the National
Commission on Water Quality.147 Nonetheless, even this
evidence does not directly support the central point of the
rigidity proposition; namely, that this uniformity of choice is
explained by administrative pressure or fear of enforcement
rather other factors. Section IV.C.2 addresses this point in
more detail.
144. Fiorino, supra note 52, at 478 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
145. 40 C.F.R. § 63.113(a)(2) (2008).
146. D. Bruce LaPierre, Technology-Forcing and Federal Environmental
Protection Statutes, 62 IOWA L. REV. 771, 825-26 (1977).
147. Id. at 825 n.324; see NAT’L COMM’N ON WATER QUALITY, STAFF REPORT II-68
(1976).
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This part has set out the basic framework of the
conventional construction, drawn from statements and
references in scores of law review articles. One could argue
it reads too much into isolated statements scattered
throughout these articles. More specifically, almost all of
the articles advanced one reform or another; the discussions
of command and control regulation could simply be general
background understandably relying upon broadly framed
descriptions of its structure and operation. For example,
because the passing remark “[i]t makes no sense to say that
all industries must adopt the same control technology”148
sacrifices nuance for clarity and directness, it may not
reflect the authors’ deeper understanding of the intricacies
of command and control regulation. As Edward L. Rubin
warned in another context:
Because they are operating within an ongoing discourse, many
scholars tend to lapse into a conceptual shorthand, reifying law or
texts in ways that they would not defend. . . . But a serious
critique must aim at the most advanced, well-reasoned portions of
its subject matter, rather than trying to pick off waifs and
stragglers.149

Professor Rubin’s admonition is well-taken; no doubt
some of the discussion of command and control regulation in
the literature is academic shorthand, or perhaps even
carelessness—the “waifs and stragglers.”150 Even Professor
Stewart sometimes slips into characterizing command and
control regulation as requiring the use of “specific pollution
control technologies.”151 Nonetheless, for the most part the
claims made by the conventional construction’s leading
proponents and by many of its adopters are, in fact, quite
well articulated, as the analysis of their grounds and
warrants demonstrate. Moreover, the perspective reflected
in the conventional construction is more than simple
background or context; it is presented as the underlying
148. Sunstein, supra note 49, at 1019.
149. Rubin, supra note 16, at 1854-55.
150. Indeed, the coders in the current project had to make fairly nuanced
decisions in some cases about whether the author was expressing one of the
propositions or not.
151. Stewart, supra note 53, at 341. As discussed above, Professor Stewart has
adopted a much more nuanced form of the rigidity proposition elsewhere. See
Stewart, supra note 55, at 550; Stewart, supra note 5, at 1269-70.
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basis for reform. This is not the case of academic nods to a
long-resolved debate, or the traditional recitation of the
discipline’s canon. Instead, these articles use expansive,
largely unsubstantiated statements about how the
regulatory system functions and about the relative
capacities of government and industry to justify
fundamental reforms. The conventional literature lacks
meaningful consideration of alternative depictions of the
regulatory system and an appreciation of what an
alternative depiction might suggest about the course for
reform. Part IV examines one such alternative construction.
IV. UNDER CONSTRUCTION: DEFAULT STANDARDS
This part sets out an alternative construction of
traditional command and control regulation, focusing on the
air quality regulatory system. Although this alternative
construction has not been expressly articulated as such in
the existing literature, its threads can be found in the work
of a number of scholars.152 To varying degrees these scholars
reject the conventional construction, taking issue with one
or more of the three propositions and its associated
theoretical framework.153
This alternative construction offers a quite different
view of the law, the agency, and the firm than the
conventional construction. In the alternative construction,
152. See, e.g., Driesen, supra note 55, at 289 (describing “economic incentive”
programs); Timothy F. Malloy, Regulating by Incentives: Myths, Models, and
Micromarkets, 80 TEX. L. REV. 531 (2002); Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas O.
McGarity, Not So Paradoxical: The Rationale for Technology-Based Regulation,
1991 DUKE L.J. 729; Wagner, supra note 122, at 83.
153. See generally Cole & Grossman, supra note 72, at 887 (rejecting rigidity
proposition and questioning the efficiency warrant); Driesen, supra note 55, at
296-308 (rejecting the homogeneity proposition); Howard Latin, Ideal Versus
Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standards and “Fine
Tuning” Regulatory Reform, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1268-69 (1985) (rejecting the
homogeneity proposition); Malloy, supra note 152, at 545 (rejecting the
competency proposition and associated innovation warrant); Richard L. Revesz,
Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom”
Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992)
(rejecting the “race to the bottom” proposition); Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L.
Glicksman, Goals, Instruments, and Environmental Policy Choice, 10 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 297 (2000) (rejecting the rigidity proposition); Wagner,
supra note 122, at 89 (rejecting the competency proposition).
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the regulations establish emission limits based on the best
practices within the relevant industry, yet essentially leave
it to the regulated businesses to select the means of
achieving those standards. It draws finer distinctions
between categories of firms—differentiating between those
categories based upon the known financial and technical
capacities of the firms within them—and the relative health
and environmental risks they may pose. Lastly, it reverses
the conventional construction’s characterization of the
relative competencies of “government” and “firm” in terms
of information collection and synthesis.
A. Emission Levels and Default Technologies: Responding
to the Rigidity Proposition
According to the rigidity proposition, traditional
regulation imposes express or de facto technology
requirements on businesses. Under the alternative
construction, the agency sets up emission standards rather
than design standards. It sets emission levels by reference
to the best performing businesses, identifying the emission
level generally attained by responsible companies using
state of the art technologies. The resulting “technologybased” regulation requires similarly situated businesses to
meet that emission level, but leaves the means of achieving
the level up to the individual business.154 Thus, so long as a
facility complies with the emission level, it can use the same
technology relied upon by the agency, or it can adopt an
entirely different technology.155
The actual language and structure of existing
regulation supports this construction. As part of this study,
154. This description refers to “self-executing” regulations, which are
requirements that apply to particular types of activities whether the facility is
otherwise required to obtain an environmental permit for its operations. Default
standards also appear in permitting programs.
155. Reliance on technology-based standards could result in both overregulation and under-regulation. Over-regulation would occur where the
technology reduces emissions to levels below those necessary to protect humans
or the environment. Two mechanisms limit the likelihood of this to some degree.
First, in choosing which sectors to regulate under the NSPS and MACT
programs, EPA must first make the determination that under-regulation results
when the industries’ best practices are not sufficiently protective, exposing
populations to significant residual risk even after attainment of the emission
standard.
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we reviewed two major sets of federal air quality
regulations: the New Source Performance Standards (the
“NSPS” program)156 and National Emission Standards for
Hazardous Air Pollutants (the “MACT” program).157
Together, these two programs establish emission limits and
operating standards for hundreds of diverse emission
sources in a broad spectrum of industries ranging from
professional dry cleaning to petrochemical manufacturing.158
The review, which focused on whether program rules
mandated specific control technologies, revealed three
significant features of these classic programs.159
First, most of the rules do not mandate the use of any
particular control technology. In the NSPS program, ninetythree percent of the rules examined set an emission limit
that could be met through any available technology.160 Only
156. The NSPS provisions establish technology-based standards for emissions
of “criteria” pollutants. See Standards of Performance for New Stationary
Sources; Glass Manufacturing Plants, 45 Fed. Reg. 66,742, 66,743 (Oct. 7, 1980)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (“Standards of performance are promulgated
under Section 111 of the Clean Air Act. Section 111(b)(1)(A) requires that the
Administrator establish standards of performance for categories of new,
modified, or reconstructed stationary sources which, in the Administrator’s
judgment, cause or contribute significantly to air pollution, which may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”).
157. The MACT program establishes standards to control hazardous air
pollutants. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants
Phosphoric Acid Manufacturing and Phosphate Fertilizers Production, 64 Fed.
Reg. 31,358, 31,359 (June 10, 1999) (to be codified 40 C.F.R. pt. 9, pt. 63)
(“Section 112 of the [Clean Air] Act requires the Agency to promulgate
regulations for the control of [hazardous air pollutant (“HAP”)] emissions from
both new and existing major sources. The statute requires the regulations to
reflect the maximum degree of reduction in emissions of HAPs that is
achievable taking into consideration the cost of achieving the emission
reduction, any nonair quality health and environmental effects, and energy
requirements. This level of control is commonly referred to as the maximum
achievable control technology (MACT).”).
158. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 60.100-60.109 (2008) (petroleum refinery standards); 40
C.F.R. §§ 60.620-60.625 (2008) (petroleum dry cleaning standards); 40 C.F.R. §§
63.320-63.326 (2008) (perchloroethylene standards for dry cleaning facilities); 40
C.F.R. § 63.640-63.679 (2008) (national emission standards for hazardous air
pollutants for petroleum refineries).
159. The review data (in the form of two Excel spreadsheets) is on file with the
Buffalo Law Review.
160. See NSPS Excel spreadsheet (on file with the Buffalo Law Review). We
examined eighty-three rules promulgated between 1977 and 2000.
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six rules set out a technology mandate; in each of those
cases the agency determined that it was infeasible to
prescribe or enforce a performance standard.161 The MACT
program made use of more design standards, primarily with
respect to so-called “fugitive” emissions; that is, emissions
that were not discharged through a stack or vent, and thus,
are difficult to collect or measure. Typical sources of fugitive
emissions
include
large
storage
tanks,
surface
impoundments, wastewater treatment systems and also
valves, pumps and flanges, all of which are in wide use
across a number of industrial sectors. In such cases, the
rules typically establish either design standards (for the
tanks and impoundments) or fairly specific work practices
in the form of leak detection and repair practices (for valves
and flanges). That said, however, the primary regulatory
instrument even for the MACT program remains
performance standards.
Our evaluation was consistent with a 1995 evaluation
by the Office of Technology Assessment (“OTA”), which
concluded that performance standards were the primary
regulatory tool used in Clean Air Act regulations.162 (Indeed,
the OTA study goes even further, reaching the identical
conclusion with respect to all regulatory programs.)163 Given
the actual language of the Clean Air Act, these findings are
unsurprising. The organic provisions for both programs
direct the EPA to establish “emission limitations” and
“emission standards” based on technologies used by
industry,164 but expressly prohibit the EPA from requiring

161. See, e.g., Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources and
Guidelines for Control of Existing Sources: Municipal Solid Waste Landfills, 56
Fed. Reg. 24,468, 24,484 (May 30, 1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52,
60) (prescribing “best demonstrated system of continuous emission reduction”
for new municipal solid waste landfills); Standards of Performance for New
Stationary Sources; Petroleum Dry Cleaners, 47 Fed. Reg. 56,118, 56,124
(December 14, 1982) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (rejecting performance
standards for petroleum drycleaners as impracticable).
162. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
TOOLS: A USER’S GUIDE 14-15 (1995).
163. Id.
164. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (a)(1), (b)(1)(B) (2006) (describing the NSPS
program); 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2)-(3) (2006) (describing MACT standards).
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the use of specific technologies absent an infeasibility
finding.165
Second, while most rules do not require adoption of
specific control technologies, they do reflect the reality that
the emission limits were established by reference to
technologies commonly used by industry. The bureaucratic
bow to the so-called “reference” technologies comes in the
form of monitoring, recordkeeping, and operation and
maintenance (“O&M”) provisions associated with the
emission limit. Monitoring and recordkeeping standards are
necessary for the facility, the regulators and the public to
determine whether the facility is meeting the limit. O&M
plans assure that once installed, the technology will
continue to be operated properly. Recognizing that most
facilities will likely use a reference technology, the rules
include default performance testing, recordkeeping and
O&M provisions tailored to the relevant reference
technologies.166 But even here, a facility has significant
flexibility. Many provisions provide the opportunity for
submission of alternative monitoring, recordkeeping and
O&M practices, even with respect to reference
technologies.167
Third, the relatively few rules that do mandate specific
control technologies also invariably provide the facility with
opportunities to use alternative technologies. Both the
NSPS and MACT programs allow facilities to adopt an
“alternative means of emissions limitation” upon approval
by the EPA.168 The facility must demonstrate that the
165. See § 7411(h)(1); § 7412(h)(1).
166. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 60.313 (2008) (setting out performance testing
requirements for control technologies used to manage emissions from the
surface coating of furniture under the NSPS program); 40 C.F.R. § 63.958060.9652 (2008) (prescribing testing, monitoring, and recordkeeping
requirements for reference technologies under the MACT program for taconite
iron ore processing).
167. See 40 C.F.R. § 60.8(b) (2008) (describing alternative performance test
protocols under the NSPS program); 40 C.F.R. §§ 63.7(e), 63.8(f), 63.10(f) (2008)
(describing alternative MACT testing, monitoring and recordkeeping
requirements).
168. See § 7411(h)(3); § 7412(h)(3). EPA has included the equivalency
determination process in a variety of rules under both programs. See, e.g., 40
C.F.R. §§ 60.114b (volatile organic liquid storage vessels); 60.632(c) (onshore
natural gas processing plants); 60.592(c) (petroleum refineries); 60.716
(magnetic tape coating facilities); 61.12(d) (alternative means of emission
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alternative is as effective as (or better than) the required
technology in reducing emissions and must include custom
monitoring and reporting protocols.169 Other mechanisms for
alternative management strategies exist. For example, since
1977, the NSPS program has offered innovative technology
waivers, providing facilities with additional time to comply
with emission limits when using new technologies.170 More
recently, the MACT program established the “equivalencyby-permit” mechanism by which facilities may adopt
alternative control strategies through state site-specific
permitting.171
The impact of these three features on the rigidity
proposition varies with the form of the proposition being
considered. Recall that the rigidity proposition has strong,
moderate, and functional forms. The strong form, which
states that traditional regulation expressly mandates
specific control technology, is clearly untenable in the face of
the three features. Likewise, the three features conclusively
undermine the moderate form of the rigidity proposition,
which posits that technology mandates are often or
sometimes used in traditional regulation. In fact, technology
mandates are rarely used in the regulations; when they are
established, facilities may seek waivers for the use of
alternative approaches.
The functional form of the rigidity proposition remains
viable. It acknowledges that traditional regulation does not
explicitly mandate particular technology, but instead claims
that the regulatory environment effectively forces facilities
to adopt the EPA’s reference technology.172 For some
proponents of the functional form, this rigidity springs from
the businesses’ desire to “play it safe,” to avoid onerous
limitation); 63.177 (alternative controls for equipment, design or operational
requirement); see also Recent Posting to the Applicability Determination Index
(ADI), 69 Fed. Reg. 7,926 (Feb. 20, 2004) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60, 61,
63) (describing owner or operator requests to EPA).
169. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 60.114b (2008).
170. See § 7411(j).
171. See 40 C.F.R. § 63.94 (2008) (“State may seek approval of State permit
terms and conditions to be implemented and enforced in lieu of specified
existing and future Federal section 112 rules, emission standards, or
requirements . . . .”).
172. See Hahn & Hester, supra note 51.
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enforcement actions should their chosen technology fail to
meet the mandated emission limit.173 For others, it results
from conservative implementation by the agencies’ permit
writers purportedly unwilling to approve alternatives to
reference technologies.174
Yet there is virtually no evidence to support the
functional form and its claim of a de facto effect. Even the
OTA study, which adopts the functional rigidity proposition,
confesses that no supporting data exists175 and that “[t]he
prevalence of de facto technology specifications is
unknown.”176 Nonetheless, the proposition offers an
intuitively appealing story, a believable explanation for the
commonly accepted perception that facilities almost always
adopt the reference technology.177 It is a story—and a not
unreasonable one—about how the regulatory system works;
173. See Robert M. Friedman et al., Environmental Policy Instrument Choice:
The Challenge of Competing Goals, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L & POL’Y F. 327, 356-57
(2000) (describing inefficient outcomes because of uniform treatment of sources);
Dennis D. Hirsch, Symposium Introduction: Second Generation Policy and the
New Economy, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2001) (discussing choice of EPA
“reference technology” to avoid compliance concerns); Stewart, supra note 55, at
552 (explaining compliance).
174. See NEIL GUNNINGHAM
writer conservatism).

ET AL.,

SMART REGULATION 39 n.5 (1998) (permit

175. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 26, at 97.
176. Id. at 16.
177. Remarkably, there appears to be no significant empirical evidence to
support even this perception. I have been unable to find any reports or other
sources that collate and evaluate information regarding the actual nature of
technology choices made by facilities under the NSPS or MACT programs. The
apparently low level at which facilities utilize the alternative means of emission
limitation mechanisms under those programs provides some indication of
uniformity. Despite the ubiquitous nature of these mechanisms, research
reveals only one request, which EPA denied in 1982. See Standards of
Performance for New Stationary Sources: Petroleum Liquid Storage Vessels;
Notice of Final Equivalency Determinations, 47 Fed. Reg. 54,259 (Dec. 1, 1982)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (explaining that seal systems for petroleum
liquid storage vessels are not equivalent to the systems required by Subpart Ka
of 40 CFR Part 60). Approvals must be noticed by EPA in the Federal Register.
A Lexis search of the Federal Register turned up only the seal system rejection
referenced above. EPA’s response to a FOIA request confirmed this. For an
analysis of underuse of innovative technology waivers under the Clean Water
Act, see generally U.S. EPA, PROVIDING WAIVERS FROM NPDES PERMIT
COMPLIANCE SCHEDULES FOR INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION PREVENTION TECHNOLOGY
29-37 (1994).
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a story of rigid, bureaucratic agencies and frustrated yet
fearful businesses.
This narrative provides a plausible explanation for
technology choices by regulated businesses, but those
choices are equally consistent with at least two alternative
stories. In one, it is the businesses rather than the
regulations or agencies that are rigid. Despite the freedom
to choose alternatives, the business hews to the standard
technology. This inflexibility may flow from external forces;
perhaps the firm’s environmental consultant or technology
vendor champions the standard technology in response to
market incentives.178 Then again, it may result from inertia
within the firm, a resistance to innovation that has been
linked to excessively rigid internal operating procedures,
incentive structures, and resource allocation practices
within companies.179
The other alternative story focuses instead on the
quality of the government’s analysis of best practices within
the industry sector. Suppose for a moment that in setting a
performance standard for a given industry sector, the EPA
has managed to identify best pollution control practices
within that sector accurately. Along the way, the agency
carefully segmented the sector into appropriate subcategories, taking into account size, technical capacities,
relevant process differences and cost of control.180 If the
agency has done its job properly, the reference technology
should be the best fit—both technically and economically—
of all existing technologies. In that case, we should expect to
see widespread adoption of the reference technology, not
because of the company’s fear of enforcement or the
bureaucrat’s desire for conformity, but because using the
reference technology makes the most sense.
Of course none of the proffered stories, neither mine nor
Professor Stewart’s, are supported by a conclusive body of
evidence. Indeed, it is entirely likely that all have some
relevance to the apparent lack of innovation and diversity in
technology choice. That is the point. By uncritically
accepting the rigidity proposition, many scholars have
178. See Malloy & Sinsheimer, supra note 48, at 206-07.
179. See Malloy, supra note 152, at 555-92.
180. See Part IV.B for a discussion of the standards for establishing
subcategories.
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closed off consideration of these alternative stories. Taking
alternative stories seriously would lead to further research
and discourse about why businesses appear to forgo existing
opportunities to use innovative technologies and
approaches. Opening the discussion in this way may also
lead to different reform proposals. For example, if
innovative opportunities are missed because of an industry
deficiency, then changing regulations to provide broader,
more accessible opportunities may be largely futile.
B. Variegated Standards: Rejecting the Homogeneity
Proposition
The homogeneity proposition holds that traditional
regulation applies a “one size fits all” approach to
regulation, failing to take into account important
differences between facilities.181 These differences include
variations in the processes used182 and the relative cost of
controls.183 Scholars tend to characterize the regulators as
181. See e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and
Creative Compliance in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 316
(1999); Stewart, supra note 71, at 31.
182. Fiorino, supra note 52, at 459.
183. See Allardice et al., supra note 60, at 363; Chase, supra note 77, at 14;
Stewart, supra note 128, at 587. Some authors also focus on the failure to
consider geographical or locational differences between facilities. See e.g.,
Lazarus, supra note 77, at 1771; Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 60, at 97. The
EPA has taken location into account, particularly where the facility creates
some significant constraint on the efficacy or cost of a potential control
technology. See, e.g., Federal Standards for Marine Tank Vessel Loading
Operations, 60 Fed. Reg. 48,388, 48,393 (Sept. 19, 1995) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 9, 63) (creating a subcategory for the Valdez Marine Terminal due to,
among other things, climatic and economic conditions that required constant
flow of oil through the pipeline and severe meteorological conditions resulting in
increased loading irregularity); Standards of Performance for New and Existing
Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, 70 Fed. Reg.
62,213, 66,216 (Oct. 28, 2005) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (proposing
different emissions standards for boilers depending upon the precipitation levels
in the areas in which the boilers were located). Location also raises issues of
exposure and harm. Distant, isolated facilities may pose less threat to human
health than those located near large populations. While technology-based
standards typically do not consider such factors, neither do market–based
instruments such as trading regimes or taxes. In practice, however, both
technology-based and market-based systems could be crafted so as to address
location-related issues of harm. See generally Roberta Mann, Waiting to
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unwilling to craft rules and variances that acknowledge “a
given firm or industry’s special circumstances,” tracing this
bureaucratic reticence to the regulator’s need to economize
on information costs and simplify enforcement efforts.184
The alternative construction tells a different story. In
this version, the agency actively uses its information
collection authority and the rulemaking process to develop
an extensive understanding of the industry and its
production processes. Examination of rules and the rulemaking documents reveals the EPA time and again
considering the technical and economic landscape and
adapting its rules to reflect differences among firms within
the affected industrial sectors. These adaptations take a
variety of forms, ranging from exemptions for certain-sized
firms, or types of processes, to standards that vary with the
size, nature or other variable attributes of the regulated
activity or firm.
Both the NSPS and MACT provisions strike a balance
between uniformity and flexibility. Regarding uniformity,
each requires that the agency identify and regulate
“categories” of air pollution sources,185 defined by the EPA as
groups of sources “having some common features suggesting
that they should be regulated in the same way and on the
same schedule.”186 Yet each also recognizes that differences
that justify divergent regulation will exist even within those
general categories. Thus, the statute expressly authorizes
the EPA to “distinguish among classes, types and sizes” of
sources within categories in establishing standards.187 In
Exhale?: Global Warming and Tax Policy, 51 AM. U.L. REV. 1135, 1209 (2002);
Stewart, supra note 71, at 100-02.
184. Stewart, supra note 58, at 670-71.
185. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c)(1) (2006).
186. Initial List of Categories of Sources Under Section 112(c)(1) of the Clean
Air Act Amendments, 57 Fed. Reg. 31,576, 31,578 (July 16, 1992).
187. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(2) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(1), (2) (2006).
Having identified the relevant source category and, as appropriate, each
subcategory nested within it, EPA next determines the reference technology;
that is, the control strategy to be used by the agency in determining the
applicable emission limit for that category or subcategory. The criteria for
reference technology selections are different for the two programs. For the
MACT program, EPA must identify the “maximum achievable control
technology,” defined as “maximum degree of reduction in emissions . . . that the
Administrator . . . determines is achievable for new or existing sources in the
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exercising that authority under the MACT program, the
EPA typically considers a variety of factors, such as
“[p]rocess operations (including differences between batch
and continuous operations), emissions characteristics,
control device applicability and costs, safety, and
opportunities for pollution prevention.”188 The agency takes
essentially the same criteria in account under the NSPS
program.189
Recognizing that customizing rules in every case to fit
each facility’s specific circumstances is very often
impractical,190 the agency has not generally engaged in
standard setting at the facility level.191 However, neither has

category or subcategory.” § 7412(d)(2), (g)(2). The NSPS program calls for “the
degree of emission limitation achievable through the application of the best
system of emission reduction.” § 7411(a)(1).
188. Initial List of Categories of Sources Under Section 112(c)(1) of the Clean
Air Act Amendments, 57 Fed. Reg. 31,576, 31,580 (July 16, 1992).
189. See Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources: Glass
Manufacturing Plants, 45 Fed. Reg. 66,742, 66,743 (Oct. 7, 1980) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (differentiating among glass manufacturing plants on the
basis of the potential for particulate emission control); see also Standards of
Performance for New Stationary Sources: Volatile Organic Liquid Storage
Vessels, 49 Fed. Reg. 29,698, 29,706 (July 23, 1984) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 60) (establishing different classes of storage tanks based on volatility of the
stored material and the size of the tanks). While this discussion focuses upon
these two Clean Air Act programs, much the same could be said about the
agency’s other major media-oriented program, the Clean Water Act. See, e.g., E.
I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 128 (1977) (holding that
under Section 301 of the Clean Water Act, EPA has the authority to promulgate
uniform effluent limitations by regulation on an industry-wide basis for classes
and categories of existing plants, “so long as some allowance is made for
variations in individual plants”); see also Tex. Oil & Gas Assoc. v. EPA, 161 F.3d
923, 940-41 (5th Cir. 1998) (“The EPA is authorized—indeed, is required—to
account for substantial variations within an existing category or subcategory of
point sources.”).
190. See E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. at 132 (noting, in
the context of the Clean Water Act, the impracticability of requiring the agency
“to give individual consideration to the circumstances” of each of the 42,000
facilities regulated under Section 301 of the Act.).
191. In some cases, however, where the record supports it, EPA has tailored
specific rules to one or just a few facilities. See 40 C.F.R. § 63.562(d) (2008)
(establishing unique MACT standards for the Valdez Marine Terminal); see also
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Phosphoric Acid
Manufacturing and Phosphate Fertilizers Production, 64 Fed. Reg. 31,358,
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it broadly adopted a “one-size-fits-all” regulatory approach.
Instead, the EPA has consistently “disaggregated”
industrial categories so as to tailor the NSPS and MACT
standards to the technical and economic conditions facing
identifiable segments within the regulated industry
sectors.192 As the EPA explained in one preamble,
“Subcategorization was necessary to reflect major variations
in production methods, raw material usage and/or
[hazardous air pollutant] emissions that potentially affect
the applicability of controls.”193
The rulemaking history under both programs provides
ample support for the view that, contrary to the story told
under the conventional construction, the agency shapes the
standards to the contours of the relevant industry. In
particular, the record reflects significant attention to
differences in two areas: the manufacturing processes
utilized by the facilities and the relative cost of controls.
Manufacturing processes vary along a variety of
dimensions, including size, characteristics of the inputs, and
nature of the process (for example, whether the process
operates continuously or in batches). Each of these features
can affect the nature and magnitude of the emissions, as
well as the efficacy of various potential control strategies.
The EPA has consistently looked to these features in
establishing variegated emission standards for the
subcategories and classes lying within the source categories
in question. For example, in distinguishing between two
types of aluminum recovery furnaces, the EPA focused upon
the type of scrap metals and nature of flux charged to the
furnaces, and the resulting differences in emissions.194
31362 (June 10, 1999) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 63) (establishing a
subcategory for a lone superphosphoric acid process line source).
192. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Printing,
Coating and Dyeing of Fabrics, 67 Fed. Reg. 46,028, 46,039 (July 11, 2002) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63) (“As part of the regulatory development process, we
evaluate the similarities and differences between industry segments or groups
of affected sources comprising a source category.”).
193. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, 60 Fed. Reg.
30,801, 30,802 (proposed June 12, 1995) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63).
194. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Source
Categories, 64 Fed. Reg. 6,946, 6,949 (Feb. 11, 1999) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 63). Group 1 furnaces, which process aluminum containing paint, lubricants,
and coatings, or process clean charge with reactive fluxing (i.e., flux containing
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Likewise, the NSPS provisions for glass manufacturing
establish different particulate matter emission standards
for three subcategories of pressed and blown glass processes
due to significant variations among those processes in the
potential for controlling such emissions.195
Contrary to claims made under the conventional
construction,196 rules often distinguish between continuous
processes and batch processes within a single category. In a
continuous process, product is typically produced in bulk on
a continuous basis without significant changes in feedstock
or processing. Batch processes typically produce materials
in separate lots, and are substantially more variable in
terms of raw materials, throughput and even operating
parameters.197 Consider continuous and batch processes
used to distill products within the synthetic organic
chemical industry. Emissions from such continuous
operations exhibited relatively constant rates and
compositions within a process unit. By contrast, gas
streams emitted from batch distillation units typically had
highly variable flow rates and composition. On this basis,
the EPA excluded batch operations from the NSPS rule for
distillation operations, concluding that the control
technology would not be effective in such circumstances.198
or forming hazardous air pollutants), are subject to a series of emission limits
for a variety of pollutants. Group 2 furnaces process clean scrap aluminum and
engage in either no fluxing or in fluxing using only nonreactive, non-HAPcontaining/non-HAP-generating gases. Accordingly, no emission limits were
established for group 2 furnaces. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 63.1503, 1505 (2008); National
Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Secondary Aluminum
Production, 65 Fed. Reg. 15,690, 15,692 (Mar. 23, 2000) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 63).
195. See Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources: Glass
Manufacturing Plants, 45 Fed. Reg. 66,742, 66,746 (Oct. 7, 1980) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (“In the process of selecting the major categories of glass
production it was found that the pressed and blown glass category had within
itself areas of production that were individually unique as to their potential for
particulate emission control.”).
196. See, e.g., Fiorino, supra note 52, at 469.
197. Malloy, supra note 152, at 599; A. Ghosh, Batch Processes and Their
Automation, in INSTRUMENT ENGINEERS’ HANDBOOK: PROCESS CONTROL 1544
(Bela G. Liptak ed., 2006).
198. See Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources; Volatile
Organic Compound (VOC) Emissions from the Synthetic Organic Chemical
Manufacturing Industry (SOCMI) Distillation Operations, 55 Fed. Reg. 26,931,
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In other instances, the EPA has responded to
differences between continuous and batch operations by
establishing distinct emission standards. Take the case of
steel pickling operations in which heavy scale on the surface
of steel is removed by treating the steel with a hydrochloric
acid solution.199 The agency acknowledged that batch and
continuous processes were markedly different200 and set two
separate emission limits for new batch processes and new
continuous processes.201 Most recently, the EPA proposed
differential standards for “process vents” associated with
continuous and batch processes in specified types of
chemical manufacturing facilities.202 While there is ample
room for substantive disagreement over the distinctions the
EPA has drawn between continuous and batch processes in
particular cases, it is clear that the agency does indeed
draw such distinctions on a regular basis.203
26,940 (June 29, 1990) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60); see also Standards of
Performance for New Stationary Sources; Polypropelene, Polyethelyne,
Polystyrene and Poly- (ethylene terephthalate) Manufacturing Industry, 55 Fed.
Reg. 51,010, 51,018 (Dec. 11, 1990) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (excluding
batch operations from the NSPS rule for the polypropylene, polyethylene,
polystyrene, and poly-(ethylene terephthalate) manufacturing industry).
199. EPA describes the two processes as follows: “The category includes both
continuous and batch pickling operations. In the continuous pickling process the
steel is fed through a sequence of tanks in a countercurrent direction to the flow
of the acid solution; next, the steel is passed through a series of rinse tanks or a
rinsing section. In the batch pickling process, the steel is immersed in an acid
solution until the scale or oxide film is removed, lifted from the bath, allowed to
drain, and then rinsed by spraying or immersion in rinse tanks.” National
Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Steel Pickling Facilities
HCL Process, 62 Fed. Reg. 49,052, 49,053 (Sept. 18, 1997) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 63).
200. Id. at 49,060 (“Batch operations differ significantly from continuous
operations in three ways: (1) The physical arrangement of the unit must allow
the steel to be placed into and withdrawn from the top instead of the ends of the
tank, (2) emissions may vary substantially between the immersion and draining
phases of the operation, and (3) emission capture requirements are different for
the two types of operations.”).
201. 40 C.F.R. § 63.1158 (2008).
202. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for
Chemical Manufacturing Area Sources, 73 Fed. Reg. 58,352, 58,359 (Oct. 6,
2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 63).
203. See e.g., National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for
Polyether Polyols Production, 62 Fed. Reg. 46,804, 46,805 (Sept. 4, 1997) (to be
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Quite apart from differences in manufacturing
processes, under both programs the EPA has also drawn
distinctions between facilities based on the relative costs of
pollution control. On repeated occasions, the NSPS program
has distinguished between types of facilities based on the
incremental cost of pollution controls for those facilities.204
As early as 1984, the agency relied upon the relative costeffectiveness of controls to distinguish between different
types of tanks used to store volatile organic liquids such as
petroleum products or solvents. In that case, the EPA
observed that as the size of the tank and the volatility of the
liquid decreased, the controls became less and less costeffective.205 Based on that analysis, the agency established
size and volatility cut-offs below which controls were not
required.206 Most recently, in 2008, the EPA proposed
codified 40 C.F.R. pt.63) (distinguishing between batch and continuous
processes in the production of polyether polyols); National Emission Standards,
60 Fed. Reg. 16,090, 16,092 (Mar. 29, 1995) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63)
(describing batch and continuous processes for production of Group IV polymers
and resins); see also Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources and
Emission Guidelines for Existing Sources: Medical Waste Incinerators, 60 Fed.
Reg. 10,654 (Feb. 27, 1995) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (proposing NSPS
rule for municipal waste incinerators); National Emission Standards for
Hazardous Air Pollutants: Halogenated Solvent Cleaning, 58 Fed. Reg. 62,566,
62,568 (Nov. 29, 1993) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63) (proposing six
subcategories of the halogenated solvent cleaning source category based upon
size and type—batch or continuous—of processing); see also Standards of
Performance for New Stationary Sources; Polypropelene, Polyethelyne,
Polystyrene and Poly- (ethylene terephthalate) Manufacturing Industry, 55 Fed.
Reg. 51,010 (Dec. 11, 1990) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (describing rules
for that industry).
204. The incremental cost per ton is the difference in annual costs between a
baseline (either no control or a different control option) and the proposed control
divided by the difference in annual emissions. EPA typically uses this metric as
a measure of the economic feasibility of applying emission control technology to
a source. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for
Stationary Combustion Turbines, 68 Fed. Reg. 1,888, 1,896 (Jan. 14, 2003) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63).
205. See Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources: Volatile
Organic Liquid Storage Vessels, 49 Fed. Reg. 29,698, 29,706 (July 23, 1984) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (including petroleum liquid storage vessels
constructed after July 23, 1984).
206. 40 C.F.R. § 60.110(b). EPA used this approach in a number of other
rulemakings in the NSPS program. See Standards of Performance for New
Stationary Sources; Magnetic Tape Manufacturing Industry, 51 Fed. Reg. 2996,
3004 (proposed Jan. 22, 1986) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 60); Standards of
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disparate limits for particulate matter emissions from coal
preparation plants handling different types of coal. The
agency identified the use of chemical suppressants as the
reference technology for plants processing bituminous coal
and fabric filters (also known as “baghouses”) for all other
plants.207 This distinction was based upon the relative costeffectiveness of the two control technologies when used at
the different types of plants.208
For the MACT program, however, treatment of
differences between facilities concerning the cost of control
is a mixed bag. The nuance here flows from the Clean Air
Act’s layered definition of maximum achievable control
technology, which includes an open-ended narrative
standard “backstopped” by a narrowly drawn minimum
requirement. Section 112(d) defines MACT broadly as “the
maximum degree of reduction in emissions . . . taking into
consideration the cost of achieving such emission reduction,
and any non-air quality health and environmental impacts
and energy requirements,” a definition that would seem to
explicitly require consideration of the cost of control.209
However, the statute also establishes minimum criteria for
MACT, a floor below which it may not fall but above which
it may be set.210 Generally speaking, for an existing source
that floor is based upon the average emission level achieved
by the best performing sources in the relevant category. In
National Lime Ass’n v. Environmental Protection Agency,
the court concluded that the EPA may not take cost into
account in determining the MACT floor for a given category,
although cost is an allowable consideration in the event the
EPA decides to go beyond the floor.211 Thus, all sources in a
single category must be held to the MACT floor—the
Performance for New Stationary Sources Polymeric Coating of Supporting
Substrates, 52 Fed. Reg. 15,906 (proposed Apr. 30, 1987) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 60).
207. Standards of Performance for Coal Preparation Plants, 73 Fed. Reg.
22,901, 22,904-05 (proposed Apr. 28, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
208. Id.; see also Standards of Performance for Petroleum Refineries, 73 Fed.
Reg. 35,838, 35,849 (June 24, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60)
(establishing differential standards for large and small sulfur recovery units at
petroleum refineries based on incremental cost-effectiveness).
209. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2) (2006).
210. Id. § 7412(d)(3).
211. 233 F.3d 625, 640 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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standards achieved by the best performers—regardless of
the cost implications.212
Nonetheless, this wrinkle does not prove the legitimacy
of the homogeneity proposition. While the agency cannot
distinguish between facilities based on cost in setting the
MACT floor, it has broad discretion to break them into
subcategories and classes. The factors used for
subcategorization, such as nature of emissions, applicability
of controls, and facility size, often drive variations in control
costs among the facilities.213 Thus, by drawing distinctions
212. Previously, EPA had repeatedly taken the position that it could use
control cost as a factor in disaggregating a category into separate subcategories.
See National Emissions Standard for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Source
Categories, 62 Fed. Reg. 49,052, 49,060 (proposed Sept. 18, 1997) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63) (The rulemaking for steel pickling operations identifies the
criteria for subcategorization and includes “process operations (including
differences between continuous and batch operations), emission characteristics,
control device applicability and costs, safety, and opportunities for pollution
prevention”); National Emissions Standard for Hazardous Air Pollutants;
Rubber Tire Manufacturing, 65 Fed. Reg. 62,414, 62,423 (proposed Oct. 18,
2000) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63) (taking same position in rubber tire
manufacturing rulemaking). This position found some support in the legislative
history; the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee observed: “Cost
and feasibility are factors which may be considered by the Administrator when
establishing an emissions limitation for a category under section 112. . . .
Nothing in this language authorizes the establishment of a category based
wholly on economic grounds . . . .” See S. REP. NO. 101-228, at 166 (1989),
reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 8341, 8506). Nonetheless, National Lime raised
serious questions regarding the position—questions intensified by the later
decision in National Resources Defense Council v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 489 F.3d 1364, 1376 (D.C. Cir. 2007). But see Sierra Club v. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, 479 F.3d 875, 884-85 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (concurring opinion suggesting
that costs may be relevant in subcategorization). In any event, EPA had
abandoned the position by 2003. See National Emissions Standards for
Hazardous Air Pollutants for Brick and Structural Clay Products
Manufacturing, 68 Fed. Reg. 26,690, 26,697 (May 16, 2003) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 63).
213. Compare the proposed and final rules for clay ceramics manufacturing in
which EPA justified separate standards for small tunnel kilns based on cost in
the proposal, but rejected cost as an appropriate factor and instead relied upon
technological differences and air flow. National Standards for Hazardous Air
Pollutants for Brick and Structural Clay Products Manufacturing; and National
Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Clay Ceramics
Manufacturing, 67 Fed. Reg. 47,894, 47,904 (proposed July 22, 2002) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R pt. 63) (proposed rule); 68 Fed. Reg. 26,690, 26,696-97 (May
16, 2003) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63) (final rule).
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between the classes of facilities based on non-economic
factors, the EPA often accommodates difference in cost as
well. In addition, the EPA clearly has the authority, indeed
the obligation, to consider cost differences in establishing
“beyond-the-floor” standards and has done so.214
All that said, one cannot escape the reality that existing
regulation does not respond to the individual economic and
technological circumstances of each facility. Even after
slicing industries into subcategories and classes, the agency
still engages in generalizations, often expressly developing
representative “model plants” for purposes of “projecting
national impacts, including HAP emission reduction levels,
costs, energy, and secondary impacts.”215 Actual impacts for
individual facilities will likely vary, and some “outlier”
facilities may face unusually high compliance costs. In
appropriate circumstances, traditional regulation could be
improved to take greater account of such individual
differences. For example, emissions trading regimes could
provide an alternative compliance option to such facilities,
allowing them to purchase emission credits generated by an
“over-performing” facility in lieu of incurring those high
compliance costs.216 Trading programs, however, have their
214. See National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants;
Miscellaneous Organic Chemical Manufacturing, 68 Fed. Reg. 63,852, 63,871
(Nov. 10, 2003) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63) (“The revised cost analysis
shows that for processes with continuous process vents, the cost of the subpart
TT program (the MACT floor) is $3,200/Mg, the cost of the subpart UU program
is $2,800/Mg, and the incremental cost to go beyond the MACT floor to the
subpart UU program is $470/Mg. These costs are considered reasonable.
Conversely, for batch processes, the costs of the beyond-the-floor option were
determined to be unreasonable. Therefore, we decided to set the standard at the
MACT floor for processes with only batch process vents, and we selected the
beyond-the-floor option of subpart UU for processes with at least one continuous
process vent.”).
215. Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources; Perchloroethylene
Dry Cleaners, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,382 (proposed Dec. 9, 1991) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 60).
216. In many cases, the emissions trading regime is simply layered over
traditional regulation, as in EPA’s open market trading system, providing an
additional compliance option. Roger K. Raufer, Market-Based Pollution Control
Regulation: Implementing Economic Theory in the Real World, 26 ENVTL. POL. &
L. 177, 179-80 (1996). In other, so-called “cap and trade” regimes, an aggregate
quantity of allowable emissions is set for the entire population of covered
facilities, with tradable emission allowances allocated on some basis to those
facilities. Id. at 179-81. For example, the South Coast Air Quality Management
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own substantial limitations, including disproportional
impact on local communities, emissions monitoring
concerns, and thin markets, which constrain their practical
use.217
The point here though is not that existing regulation is
so finely textured that it accounts for all significant
individual facility conditions. While that is true in some
cases, in many, it is not. Clearly, in some circumstances it
can be improved or even replaced with other regulatory
approaches. Rather, the point is that the conventional
construction, with its oft-repeated “one-size-fits-all”
moniker, substantially overstates the level of generalization
involved. The alternative construction’s perspective, which
is grounded in actual practice, emphasizes that the agency
has consistently exercised the significant flexibility provided
by the statute to take economic, technological, locational
and other circumstances into account in setting
performance standards.218

District’s RECLAIM cap and trade program for NOx based the emissions cap on
the aggregate emissions that would have been produced under existing and
planned command and control regulations. See David Harrison, Jr., Tradable
Permits for Air Pollution Control: The US Experience, in IMPLEMENTING
DOMESTIC TRADABLE PERMIT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 37 (Organisation
for Economic Co-Operation and Development ed., 1999). The cap for the federal
acid rain trading program resulted as much (or perhaps more) from political
compromise as from scientific evaluation and principled policy analysis. See
generally Lisa Heinzerling, Selling Pollution, Forcing Democracy, 14 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 300 (1996).
217. See, e.g., Raul P. Lejano & Rei Hirose, Testing the Assumptions Behind
Emissions Trading in Non-Market Goods: The RECLAIM Program in Southern
California, 8 ENVTL. SCI. & POL’Y 367, 374-75 (2005); Noga Morag-Levine, The
Problem Of Pollution Hotspots: Pollution Markets, Coase, and Common Law, 17
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 161 (2007); Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L.
Revesz, Markets and Geography: Designing Marketable Permit Schemes to
Control Local and Regional Pollutants, 28 Ecology L.Q. 569 (2001). As more
toxicity information becomes available, trading in emissions previously thought
to have little local health effects can become problematic. See Lejano & Hirose,
supra, at 372 (noting that researcher have begun to identify toxicity associated
with NOx).
218. This discussion has focused on the flexibility afforded by the
subcategorization process. The Clean Air Act and other environmental statutes
provide flexibility through other mechanisms as well, including variances,
waivers, and emissions averaging.

2010]

SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION

331

C. Role Reversal: Challenging the Competency Proposition
The competency proposition presents two opposing
images: the lumbering government bureaucracy and the
nimble, self-aware business entity. While such imagery can
be viscerally compelling, the proponents of the competency
proposition provide virtually no empirical support for it.
Instead, they rely heavily on rhetoric and metaphor, such as
Professor Stewart’s oft-repeated comparison of command
and control regulation to “Soviet-style central planning” and
references to Hayek’s economic theories.219 All this aside,
there is good reason to believe that a central government
agency is particularly well-suited to collect, evaluate, and
act upon the type of information required to achieve the
policymakers’ goal: identifying and enforcing default
performance standards of the nature discussed in Section
III.A, above. Likewise, individual small and large
businesses face significant constraints in selecting and
implementing effective pollution control approaches. This
section sets out this alternative construction of the relative
capacities of government and industry, but first it
challenges the rhetoric of the conventional construction.
1. Rhetorical Frame: Command and Control as Sovietstyle Central Planning. Few people in the United States
would argue that a government agency is well equipped to
displace the market economy in allocating resources and
setting prices. Nonetheless, comparing the EPA’s command
and control regulation to centralized planning in socialist or
communist economies distorts the role of that agency in two
distinct ways. First, it misrepresents the agency’s ultimate
goal, exaggerating the limited market intervention in which
the agency engages. Second, it misstates the scope and
nature of the information required by the EPA in setting
the default performance standards.

219. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 52, at 1334; see Jonathan H. Adler,
Legal Obstacles to Private Ordering in Marine Fisheries, 8 ROGER WILLIAMS U.
L. REV. 9, 16 (2002) (discussing Hayek’s theories); Bernard S. Black & Richard
J. Pierce, Jr., The Choice Between Markets and Central Planning in Regulating
the U.S. Electricity Industry, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1342, 1389-90 (1993) (comparing
environmental and energy regulation to central planning as used by the Soviet
Union); Stewart, supra note 128, at 587 (comparing command and control
regulation to central planning of economic activity).
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Generally speaking, in a socialist state, the central
planner controls and allocates resources throughout the
national economy so as to maximize social welfare.220 An
effective central planning agency must collect an enormous
amount of information about a multitude of variables,
including virtually every aspect of the manufacturing
process, factors of production, the logistics of distribution,
and the needs and wants of consumers.221 Having obtained
that information, the planner must perform the necessary
analysis to allocate resources.222 The required information,
which includes tacit as well as explicit knowledge, is
distributed across thousands and perhaps millions of
persons and entities and can change in significant ways in
short order.223 As Mises, Hayek, and others argued, such
information is more effectively communicated and acted
upon by individual actors within a market economy reacting
to price signals than through a centralized planning
system.224

220. See Karen I. Vaughn, Economic Calculation Under Socialism: The
Austrian Contribution, 18 ECON. INQUIRY 535, 536 (1980).
221. See Richard A. Posner, Hayek, Law and Cognition, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. &
LIBERTY 147, 149 (2005).
222. Id. Vilfredo Pareto, better known for the Pareto principle, warned of the
analytical problems faced even if the necessary data were somehow obtained:
“We have seen that in the case of 100 persons and 700 commodities . . . we shall
therefore have to solve a system of 70,699 equations. This exceeds practically
the power of algebraic analysis, and this is even more true if one contemplates
the fabulous number of equations which one obtains for a population of forty
millions and several thousand commodities.” F. A. v. Hayek, Socialist
Calculation: The Competitive ‘Solution’, 7 ECONOMICA 125, 125-26 (1940)
(quoting VILFREDO PARETO, MANUEL D’ECONOMIE POLITIQUE 233-34 (2d ed. 1927));
see Peter G. Klein, Economic Calculation and the Limits of Organization, 9 REV.
AUSTRIAN ECON. 3, 9 (1996) (discussing the response of “market socialism,”
which substituted a trial and error approach to resource allocation for the
extensive calculations addressed by Pareto). Of course, much has changed since
Pareto wrote that in 1927, and the computation problems he identified are less
compelling today. Klein, supra, at 10 n.10 (recounting that Lange contended in
1970 that high speed computers resolved the calculation problem identified by
Pareto).
223. F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AMER. ECON. REV. 519,
522-26 (1945) (describing the difficulties for central planning presented by tacit
knowledge and changing conditions).
224. See Hayek, supra note 222; Vaughn, supra note 220.
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The goal of traditional environmental regulation is
substantially different in nature and significantly more
modest in its ambition. Rather than divining the optimum
use of resources for the economy as a whole, traditional
regulation simply seeks to establish a minimum standard of
behavior for industry so as to reduce externalities imposed
upon the general public and the environment. Hayek
himself recognized that intervention to address
externalities is an appropriate government function, as
reflected in his justification of building regulations as being
“unquestionably desirable”:
The first [justification] is the now familiar consideration of the
harm that may be done to others by the erection of buildings
which constitute fire or health hazards; in modern conditions the
people to be considered include the neighbors and all the users of
a building who are not occupants . . . and who need some
assurance (or at least some means of ascertaining) that the
building they enter is safe.225

Hayek cautioned against the use of rigid technology
prescriptions (or what he called “specification codes”),
noting that by limiting experimentation and supporting the
status quo they obstruct economic development.226
Consistent with his admonition, traditional environmental
regulation establishes a minimum standard, leaving the
specific method of attaining that standard to the facility.227
Also, unlike the central planning regimes, traditional
regulation relies heavily upon local knowledge in setting
such minimum standards. It does so by setting emission
limits by reference to best practices within the regulated
industry sector, thus following the lead of industry itself.
Traditional regulation’s use of industry best practices as the
benchmark for emission limits is consistent with Hayek’s
225. F. A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 354-55 (1960).
226. Id. at 355. Elsewhere in THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY, Hayek discusses
the abstract nature of “true law,” observing that “[t]he rules merely provide the
framework within which the individual must move but within which the
decisions are his. . . . They are instrumental, they are means put at his disposal,
and they provide part of the data which, taken together with his knowledge of
particular circumstances of time and place, he can use as the basis for his
decision.” Id. at 152.
227. Id. at 355 (encouraging the use of minimum standards or “performance
codes”).
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perspective on the appropriate role of government. Hayek
believed that norms of behavior are better developed
through custom (or what he called “spontaneous order”)
than through legislative or bureaucratic pronouncements.
For him, government should enforce such customs rather
than formulate and impose rules from on high.228 While the
comparison of traditional regulation to the enforcement of
spontaneous order is not perfect—the agency is clearly more
involved in shaping the particulars of the regulation than
Hayek would like—it is certainly a better fit than the
comparison to socialist central economic planning.
Quite apart from difference in underlying goals, central
planning and traditional regulation differ in the nature and
scope of information required. The type of information
collected by the EPA in a typical rulemaking is limited
substantially more than the overwhelmingly extensive set of
constantly shifting data required for central economic
planning. For any given industry sector or industrial
process, the EPA focuses primarily on the type and level of
emissions, the manner of pollution management, and the
effectiveness and costs of such management options. This is
largely explicit knowledge available from a relatively small
set of industry members and other manageable sources.229
As we shall see, while the effort involved is substantial, it
does not rise to the level of complexity and scope presented
by central economic planning. Even Hayek, a leader of the
intellectual attack on socialist central planning, recognized
that the relative values of centralized and decentralized
228. F. A. HAYEK, THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE 41 (1979); F. A.
HAYEK, RULES AND ORDER 94-97, 124-26 (1973). For an excellent concise
summary and critique of Hayek’s theory of law, see Posner, supra note 221, at
148-54.
229. Tacit knowledge is highly context specific knowledge generated by
subjective experience, which is difficult to formalize and communicate. See
Andrew C. Inkpen & Adva Dinur, Knowledge Management Processes and
International Joint Ventures, 9 ORG. SCI. 454, 456 (1998). Polanyi, a leader in
the study of tacit knowledge, defined it as “nonverbalizable, intuitive, and
unarticulated.” Id. Perhaps Louis “Satchmo” Armstrong provided the best
definition in his response to a request that he explain the concept of jazz: “‘Man,
if you have to ask what it is, you’ll never know.’” See ROBERT BURLEIGH & DAVID
CATROW, WHO SAID THAT?: FAMOUS AMERICANS SPEAK 38-39 (1997). By contrast,
explicit knowledge “is transmittable in formal, systematic language and may
include explicit facts, axiomatic propositions, and symbols.” Inkpen & Dinur,
supra, at 456.
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Which of these systems is likely to be more efficient depends
mainly on the question under which of them we can expect that
fuller use will be made of the existing knowledge. . . . It will at
once be evident that on this point the position will be different
with respect to different kinds of knowledge; and the answer to
our question will therefore largely turn on the relative importance
of the different kinds of knowledge; those more likely to be at the
disposal of particular individuals and those which we should with
greater confidence expect to find in the possession of an authority
made up of suitably chosen experts.230

To answer Hayek’s question, one must determine
whether aggregated knowledge acted upon by the EPA is
more likely to achieve the relevant goal—identification of
best practices—than individual action based on local
knowledge or aggregated knowledge processed by some
inter-firm institution.
2. Assessing the Relative Capacities. In assessing the
relative capacities of business institutions and government
agencies, the central question is the capacity to do what?
The conventional construction focuses on the capacity to
choose a control technology for individual facilities. It
rejects centralized decision making by a distant agency on
two counts: local conditions, resources, and opportunities
vary, and plant personnel possess amorphous tacit
knowledge about facility operations. This analysis might be
relevant if the goal of traditional regulation—the end
sought—was selection of the best technology on an
individual basis.231 But that is not the case. Rather, the goal
is to identify industry best practices and translate them into
generally applicable performance standards (in the form of
emission limits wherever possible.) Once the ends are
established, it is left to the individual facilities to select the
most appropriate means for meeting them, and it is here
that local conditions and idiosyncratic tacit knowledge
become determinative.
One can reasonably object to the ends of traditional
regulation, and many have. Why tie performance standards
230. Hayek, supra note 223, at 521.
231. Even there, the analysis may significantly overstate the capacity of
individual businesses.
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to existing best practices? Generally speaking, policymakers
turned to technology-based standards because of the
informational barriers, scientific uncertainty, and political
constraints that undermine health-based standards. Rather
than accepting limited progress using health-based
standards,
policymakers
adopted
technology-based
standards with the goal of making meaningful headway
against what was and is generally perceived as serious
pollution problems.232 Would it not be more rational or
prudent to base standards on health concerns rather than
technology? Perhaps so, and there is significant discussion
of this issue in the literature.233 That particular debate is
largely irrelevant to the question that faces us here
however. Given that the goal is diffusion of best practices
across the relevant industry sector, the question becomes
which entity is best suited to identifying best practices.
The individual facility potentially has the most
information regarding its own existing control practices and
its relevant economic, organizational and environmental
attributes. There may be significant gaps, however, in its
local knowledge. In some cases the facility may not have
considered formally or systematically the magnitude,
nature or impacts of emissions from a particular process.
Despite the heroic vision of business presented by much of
the conventional construction literature, many companies
face
barriers
to
comprehensive
management
of
environmental issues. These barriers include limited
resources, fragmentation of departments within the firm,
financial management systems that do not properly account
for environmental costs, and institutional and cognitive
biases that emphasize short-term results over long-term
planning and growth. 234 Nonetheless, even if the company
232. See Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The
Dangerous Journey from Command to Self-Control, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
103, 114 (1998); Wagner, supra note 122, at 94-99.
233. John S. Applegate, The Perils of Unreasonable Risk: Information,
Regulatory Policy, and Toxic Substances Control, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 261, 267-68
(1991); John D. Graham, The Failure of Agency-Forcing: The Regulation of
Airborne Carcinogens Under Section 112 of the Clean Air Act, 1985 DUKE L.J.
100.
234. See George I. Kassinis, Location, Networks and Firm Environmental
Management Practices, 44 J. ENVTL. PLAN. & MGMT. 815, 816 (2001) (identifying
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does not have the necessary information regarding its
operations on hand, clearly it is in the best position to
collect that information.235
The individual facility’s advantage, however, in access
to local information is, by definition, limited primarily to its
own operations. Various personnel at the facility will likely
have some knowledge regarding practices of other facilities
whether directly through past employment or through
various social networks including common vendors,
professional associations, or joint undertakings.236 This
information will be spotty, and certainly not comprehensive
enough to support an assessment of best practices within
the larger national or regional industry sector. So, for
example, while a firm manager may be aware of the types of
control technologies used by competing firms, he or she is
unlikely to have specific information regarding capital and
operating costs, performance, and other factors typically
considered by the EPA in identifying reference technologies.
Nor would an individual likely facility be to successfully
supplement this informally collected information through
formal methods such as surveying or interviewing.
While individual facilities or even individual companies
do not have the capacity to identify best practices for an
entire industry sector, inter-firm institutions such as trade
associations may be able to play that role. Trade
associations are non-profit entities consisting primarily of
competitors in a single industry.237 Starting as informal
networking organizations in the late nineteenth century, by
barriers for small- and medium-sized enterprises); Malloy, supra note 152, at
536, 567 (describing internal organizational barriers to technology identification
and adopting in large firms).
235. That is not to say that the company will have the necessary technical
know how or equipment in-house. It may be necessary for the company to hire
additional personnel or retain third party consultants to collect the necessary
information.
236. See Diane Liang Rulke et al., Sources of Managers’ Knowledge of
Organizational Capabilities, 82 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 134, 137-38 (2000) (describing sources of information available to
firm managers, including relational learning channels consisting of personal
relationships with external parties, and non-relational channels such as trade
magazines and trade association reports).
237. JOSEPH F. BRADLEY, THE ROLE OF TRADE ASSOCIATIONS AND PROFESSIONAL
BUSINESS SOCIETIES IN AMERICA 4 (1965).
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the 1930s they had evolved into structured, autonomous
institutions often fielding a professional staff and engaging
in significant lobbying and policy development activities.238
At present there are thousands of trade associations of
varying size and sophistication in operation at the federal,
regional, state, and local level across a broad range of
industries.239 These include well known groups such as the
American Chemistry Council, American Petroleum
Institute, and Semiconductor Industry Association,240 as
well as lower profile organizations such as the Pennsylvania
and Delaware Cleaners Association, and the Door and
Hardware Institute.241
Among a variety of other functions, trade associations
facilitate information exchanges within their respective
industry sectors, and with entities outside those sectors.242
For example, some trade associations collect and aggregate
individual company data on sales, production, or demand
information from members, and subsequently disseminate
the cumulative information to the membership and
others.243 Trade associations have also generated
information regarding operating practices or technologies—
including pollution control technologies—used by the
industry. In some cases, such efforts also include technical
238. LOUIS GALAMBOS, COMPETITION & COOPERATION: THE EMERGENCE
NATIONAL TRADE ASSOCIATION 291-92 (1966).

OF A

239. CHARLES S. MACK, LOBBYING AND GOVERNMENT RELATIONS 108 (1989).
240. Thomas A. Hemphill, Self-Regulating Industry Behavior: Antitrust
Limitations and Trade Association Codes of Conduct, 11 J. BUS. ETHICS 915, 919
(1992); Alison J. Kirby, Trade Associations as Information Exchange
Mechanisms, 19 RAND J. ECON. 138 (1988).
241. See Door and Hardware Institute, http://www.dhi.org/index.php (last
visited Dec. 15, 2009)); Pa. and Del. Cleaner’s Ass’n, http://www.pdcl
ean.org/index.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2010).
242. See Kassinis, supra note 234, at 816-17 (intra and inter-sectorial
exchange); Kirby, supra note 240, at 138 (intra-sectorial exchange); Marc
Schneiberg & J. Rogers Hollingsworth, Can Transaction Cost Economics
Explain Trade Associations?, in THE FIRM AS A NEXUS OF TREATIES 320, 323
(Masahiko Aoki et al. eds., 1990). The information sharing function of trade
associations has raised collusion concerns among anti-trust regulators and
scholars. See Kirby, supra note 240, at 138.
243. Kirby, supra, note 240, at 138; Xavier Vives, Trade Association Disclosure
Rules, Incentives to Share Information, and Welfare, 21 RAND J. ECON. 409, 409
(1990).
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assistance or training programs regarding emerging
management practices or technologies.244
Generally speaking, trade associations are often in a
better position than individual firms to collect and evaluate
information regarding industry best practices. Associations
enjoy an advantage over many individual firms in terms of
access to other firms in the industry sector. While other
firms may be perceived as competitors, the trade association
and its staff are more likely to be viewed as resources and
advocates.245 Because the trade association typically will
aggregate firm-level data before dissemination to its
members, individual firms retain some level of anonymity in
providing information regarding their practices. In addition,
particularly with respect to industry sectors that include
significant numbers of smaller firms, the trade association
may have greater access than many of its member firms to
the resources and technical expertise needed to collect and
evaluate information regarding pollution management
practices.246
Generally speaking, therefore, it appears that trade
associations perform the information coordination function
fairly well in the market context. But is the trade
association better suited than the government to identify
best pollution control practices for regulatory purposes? In
that context, certain dynamics in the business environment
raise meaningful concerns about the completeness and
accuracy of the information ultimately developed. For
example, while many firms may be willing to share
operational information with the association, others will
instead provide incomplete or even misleading information
regarding pollution management. Their reticence may
reflect a desire to retain a competitive advantage, or from
the fear that disclosure will result in regulation mandating
244. See Richard N. L. Andrews, Environmental Regulation and Business ‘SelfRegulation’, 31 POL’Y SCI. 177, 183-84 (1998); Kassinis, supra note 234, at 817.
245. See LEONARD H. LYNN & TIMOTHY J. MCKEOWN, ORGANIZING BUSINESS:
TRADE ASSOCIATIONS IN AMERICA AND JAPAN 2-3 (1988); MACK, supra note 239, at
108 (“[T]rade association participation can be a highly cost-effective means of
achieving a company’s public policy objectives.”).
246. See Andrews, supra note 244, at 184, 192; Andrea Revell & Robert
Rutherfoord, UK Environmental Policy and the Small Firm: Broadening the
Focus, 12 BUS. STRATEGY & ENV’T 26, 32 (2003) (discussing the role that trade
association can play in providing technical assistance to small firms).
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similar approaches at its other plants.247 Whatever the
reason, participation in trade association surveys typically
is voluntary, thus firms can usually play coy without the
fear of meaningful sanctions from the association. Moreover,
the extent of the trade association’s penetration into the
industry can also affect the completeness of the information
it collects. Nonmembers of the association may be even less
likely to participate in the association’s collection efforts,
leaving gaps that prevent a full picture of industry
practices.
Furthermore, even where member firms provide
complete and accurate information to the trade association,
the trade association may itself shade, manipulate, or even
conceal information from the regulators.248 For many
industries, trade associations are, above all else, a
mechanism for managing and minimizing government
intrusion. In industries in which diffusion of best practices
would be costly or otherwise disruptive, the trade
association would have significant incentive to divert
regulatory attention from such practices, perhaps by
concealing or misstating their commercial utility. For
example, during rulemaking in Southern California
focusing on alternatives to perchloroethylene based dry
cleaning, the dry cleaners trade associations aggressively
attacked the efficacy and commercial viability of alternative
clean technologies.249 As in the dry cleaning case, such
behavior is particularly likely where the firms having the
most power within the association do not currently use the
state of the art technology. Of course, the inverse also may
occur. The trade association may attempt to cast technology
247. See Cary Coglianese, Business Interests and Information in
Environmental Rulemaking, in BUSINESS AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 185, 188
(Michael E. Kraft & Sheldon Kamieniecki eds., 2007) (stating that businesses
may conceal information to avoid costly regulation).
248. In addition, even where the trade association acts in good faith,
placement of the information collection and evaluation function with it raises
legitimacy issues regarding its role in the rule-making process. See Benjamin
Cashore, Legitimacy and the Privatization of Environmental Governance: How
Non-State Market-Driven (NSMD) Governance Systems Gain Rule-Making
Authority, 15 GOVERNANCE 503, 504-05 (2002).
249. See Peter Jay Sinsheimer, Fashioning a Greener Shade of Clean:
Integrating Pollution Prevention into Public Policy—The Case of Professional
Wet Cleaning (2009) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California,
Los Angeles).
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used by the most powerful firms as the best practice,
thereby affording those firms a competitive advantage
should the regulatory agency mandate potentially expensive
retrofitting of the other firms’ plants.
Like the trade association, the government has
substantially greater access than any individual firm to
information regarding best practices within the relevant
industry, as well as access to the financial and technical
resources needed to process that information. In terms of
access, the government has at least three noteworthy routes
to information. First, the agency commonly leverages the
capacities of the trade associations as part of the
rulemaking process. In many cases, the trade association
will collect information at the request of the agency—
usually in the form of surveys—or provide technical
assistance and consultation.250 Beyond that, the agency
generally has the legal authority to require submission of
information from individual facilities, as well as the power
to physically inspect their operations.251 Unlike the ofttimes
limited grasp of trade associations, this formal authority
reaches all members of the relevant industry and
recalcitrant or deceitful facilities face federal enforcement.
Third, the public nature of the rulemaking process invites
participation from a broad range of interested parties, each
often offering their own data as well as evaluation of the
data presented by the government and other participants.
A typical rule-making effort begins with informal
workshops involving stakeholders such as industry
associations, facility representatives, state and federal
regulators, and environmental groups. Such workshops are
commonly supplemented with written surveys of a large
250. For example, in the MACT rulemaking for the paper and pulp industry,
EPA relied upon a voluntary survey conducted by the American Forest and
Paper Association and the National Council of the Paper Industry for Air and
Stream Improvement. Effluent Limitations Guidelines, Pretreatment
Standards, and New Source Performance Standards; Pulp, Paper, and
Paperboard Category; National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air
Pollutants for Source Category; Pulp and Paper Production, 58 Fed. Reg. 66,078,
66,137 (Dec. 17, 1993) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 63, 430; see also
Coglianese, supra note 247, at 197-98 (EPA often consults with trade association
staff prior to interviewing facility personnel).
251. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C § 7414(a) (2006) (information submission and
inspection authorities); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6927(a) (2006).
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number of facilities, followed by more targeted, in-depth
data requests using the formal statutory information
collection authority. EPA staff or contractors also will
conduct a series of site visits at various facilities to observe
operations first-hand.252 Moreover, the agency receives
industry sector and facility-specific information through
formal comments submitted in response to proposed rules.253
The process is not linear, however, and stakeholder
meetings, conference calls and other interactions often
continue throughout the process.254
All that said, one should not overstate the government’s
competencies in this area. Identifying best practices for the
astoundingly wide range of industries and processes covered
by the NESHAP and NSPS programs was an intensely
challenging task.255 Despite the broad set of formal and

252. For example, in developing the MACT standards for surface coating (i.e.,
painting) operations, the EPA began with a workshop, followed by a “screening
survey” sent to approximately 3000 facilities, and a subsequent “detailed
questionnaire” issued to 312 facilities. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL
EMISSION STANDARDS FOR HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANTS (NESHAP) FOR SOURCE
CATEGORY: MISCELLANEOUS METAL PARTS AND PRODUCTS SURFACE COATING
OPERATIONS—TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT 2-2, 8-4-8-9, (2002) [hereinafter
EPA, COATING OPERATIONS]; Standards of Performance for New Stationary
Sources; Asphalt Processing and Asphalt Roofing Manufacture, 45 Fed. Reg.
76,404 (Nov. 18, 1980) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (“A survey of asphalt
roofing manufacturers and State, regional, and local agencies was conducted to
find well-controlled asphalt roofing plants. As a result of this survey, 27 asphalt
roofing plants were visited to select the best plants for emissions testing.”);
National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Printing, Coating,
and Dyeing of Fabrics and Other Textiles, 67 Fed. Reg. 46,028, 46,029-30 (July
11, 2002) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63) (establishing subcategories for
Printing, Coating, and Dyeing of Fabrics MACT rulemaking based upon survey
responses from the industry, facility site visit reports, and stakeholder
meetings).
253. See Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources; Volatile
Organic Compound (VOC) Emissions from the Synthetic Organic Chemical
Manufacturing Industry (SOCMI) Distillation Operations, 55 Fed. Reg. 26,931,
26,940 (June 29, 1990) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (EPA revising proposal
regarding batch distillation operations based on new technical data submitted
in response to formally promulgated rule proposal).
254. EPA, COATING OPERATIONS, supra note
circumstances, industry may be quite proactive.

252,

at

2-3.

In

some

255. Coglianese, supra note 247, at 196 (“[EPA] had to learn the about
industrial practices in over 150 different industries. EPA regulators needed vast
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informal tools available to the agency, some information will
escape the net, whether due to recalcitrant respondents or
bureaucratic blunders. Additionally, the EPA faces the
same organizational and operational barriers that plague
businesses in terms of information management and
operational efficiencies. Nor can one discount the role that
agency capture may play. Nonetheless, these factors do not
undermine the basic point that the agency’s authorities,
capacities and resources render it the better candidate for
identifying industry-wide best practices than either
individual firms relying primarily upon local knowledge or
trade associations.
CONCLUSION
My basic point is that the bulk of the discourse about
regulatory reform in the environmental area is driven by
conventional socially constructed views of regulation,
regulators, and the regulated. That conventional
construction has limited empirical support, and largely
ignores an alternative construction with stronger empirical
underpinnings. This section makes two additional points.
First, the choice between the two constructions matters: the
selection of one over the other can lead to significant
differences in the nature of the reform advanced. Second,
the ubiquitous reach of the conventional construction is
traceable to the nature of legal scholarship itself. It
concludes with strategies for dealing with competing
constructions in this and other areas.
It is fair to say the proponents of the conventional
construction tend to be strong advocates of market-based
regulation. This flows from reliance on the firm’s adaptive,
market-driven nature coupled with avoidance of
government involvement in substantive environmental
management. As I have noted elsewhere, the government’s
role is essentially limited to setting up the right incentives,
and getting out of the way.256 The alternative construction is
less optimistic about the innovative capacities of businesses,
placing more confidence in the role of government in
facilitating identification and diffusion environmental
amounts of information about manufacturing equipment and industrial
operations in each sector—and in each of their numerous subcategories.”).
256. Malloy, supra note 152, at 535.
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management strategies. These disparate perspectives on
the relative capacities of business and government will
typically lead to differing regulatory approaches.
Take the case of dynamic efficiency—the capacity of a
regulatory regime to spur the development and adoption of
innovative technologies or management strategies.
Virtually all scholars agree that dynamic efficiency is
critically important, yet the conventional and alternative
constructions offer starkly different prescriptions for
achieving it. Proponents of the conventional construction
view regulation and regulators as substantial barriers to
innovation, and offer market-based reforms such as
emissions trading, taxes, and subsidy programs as the
solution. These reforms assume that businesses actively will
seek cost-effective innovations so as to take advantages of
the incentives offered by the regulations. In the alternative
construction’s view, traditional regulation already provides
opportunities for innovation by businesses, opportunities
that appear to be largely foregone. Reform proposals thus
focus on battling impediments to innovation that lie within
the market and its constituent businesses, relying upon
strategies such as direct intervention into the firm’s
decision-making processes257 or proactive engagement in the
commercialization
and
diffusion
of
innovative
technologies.258
Two examples from California are illustrative of the
strategies that the alternative construction might utilize. In
Northern California, Contra Costa County’s Industrial
Safety Ordinance requires refineries to periodically evaluate
their operations using the precepts of inherently safer
257. See Nicholas A. Ashford, An Innovation-Based Strategy for a Sustainable
ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION:
Environment,
in
INNOVATION-ORIENTED
THEORETICAL APPROACH AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (J. Hemmelskamp et al. eds.,
2000) (discussing mandatory Technology Options Analysis); Malloy, supra note
152, at 600-03 (calling for “tailored regulation” which takes into account
features of the internal environment of the regulated firm). Such intervention
has been termed “management-based regulation” and in one form or another is
widely used in environmental regulation. See Cary Coglianese & David Lazer,
Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private Management to Achieve
Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 691 (2003); see also EPA, DEVELOPING YOUR
STORMWATER POLLUTION PREVENTION PLAN: A GUIDE FOR CONSTRUCTION SITES,
833R-06-044 (May 2007); EPA, FACILITY RESPONSE PLANNING COMPLIANCE
ASSISTANCE GUIDE.
258. See Malloy & Sinsheimer, supra note 48, at 183.
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design. 259 “Inherently safer design” seeks to integrate safety
into industrial processes through the systematic review of
those processes and evaluation of safer alternative
processes and chemicals.260 This is not simply a planning
requirement; the ordinance mandates adoption of identified
alternatives to the greatest extent feasible.261 In Southern
California, the South Coast Air Quality Management
District (AQMD) took a different tack in dealing
perchloroethylene, a probable human carcinogen used
extensively in the dry cleaning industry. Recognizing the
need for alternative cleaning systems, AQMD worked with
academia and industry to support the development and
commercialization of environmentally-benign alternative
“wet-cleaning” systems. The agency funded technical
studies to evaluate the commercial viability of the
innovative alternative, and supported demonstration sites
throughout the region. Satisfied that alternatives were
commercially viable, and apparently convinced that market
dynamics would not produce diffusion of the alternatives,
AQMD ultimately implemented a phase-out of those
perchloroethylene systems.262
The California examples are more the exception than
the rule in terms of the direction of reform; the conventional
construction and its associated reforms still dominate in the
literature. How is it that the conventional construction has
gained such traction despite its astonishing lack of
empirical support? One explanation focuses on three aspects
of legal scholarship itself: its normative nature, its

259. CONTRA COSTA COUNTY CAL., INDUSTRIAL SAFETY ORDINANCE 98-48 (Dec. 4,
1998) [hereinafter ISO Ordinance]; CONTRA COSTA HEALTH SERVICES HAZARDOUS
MATERIALS PROGRAM, INDUSTRIAL SAFETY ORDINANCE ANNUAL PERFORMANCE
REVIEW AND EVALUATION REPORT 3 (2004).
260. Timothy F. Malloy, Of Natmats, Terrorists, and Toxics: Regulatory
Adaptation in a Changing World, 26 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL. 93, 97 (2008).
261. ISO Ordinance, supra note 259, at § 450-8.016(D)(3). “Feasible” is defined
as “capable of being accomplished in a successful manner within a reasonable
period of time, taking into account economic, environmental, legal, social, and
technological factors.” ISO Ordinance, supra note 259, at § 450-8.014(c).
262. Sinsheimer, supra note 249, at 198-230; Malloy & Sinsheimer, supra note
48, at 230.
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corresponding reliance on soft empiricism, and the
instrumental character of legal training. 263
Modern legal scholarship unabashedly is normative.264
Few law review articles engage in purely descriptive
analysis of law and regulation. Instead, the typical article
identifies a flaw in existing law or legal theory and proffers
a solution.265 Thus law reform is the currency of legal
scholarship, and young scholars pursuing tenure are well
advised to identify and, if possible, “solve” a significant
problem in existing law or legal theory.266 But focusing on
the normative is surely no crime in itself. Indeed, on a
regular basis colleagues in one scientific discipline or
another have expressed to me their frustrated desire to
engage normative issues in their own work. Concerns arise
not so much from the normative focus of legal scholarship as
from two associated aspects of its execution: the use (or lack
of use) of empirical evidence and the pursuit of persuasive
force.
Regarding the first, there is little doubt that most legal
scholars are engaged in an empirical enterprise.267 Virtually
263. I acknowledge that I am engaging in my own construction activities
regarding the dynamics of legal scholarship.
264. Rubin, supra note 16, at 1847-48; see also Elizabeth Chambliss, When Do
Facts Persuade? Some Thoughts on the Market for “Empirical Legal Studies” 71
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 17, 27 n.74 (2008); Richard O. Lempert, Empirical
Results for Public Policy: With Examples from Family Law 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 907, 907-08 (2008).
265. See, e.g., Tracey E. George, An Empirical Study of Empirical Legal
Scholarship: The Top Law Schools, 81 IND. L.J. 141, 146 (2006); Rubin, supra
note 16, at 1847-48; Peter H. Schuck, Why Don’t Law Professors Do More
Empirical Research?, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 323, 329 (1989); cf. Lee Epstein & Gary
King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 18 (2002) (characterizing
virtually all modern legal scholarship as empirical, albeit flawed).
266. See Lempert, supra note 264, at 908 (discussing the pitfalls of empirical
research as compared to traditional normative work for the untenured law
faculty).
267. Of course, this statement itself makes an empirical claim, the accuracy of
which depends, in part, on the definition one uses for “empirical evidence.” Some
authors limit their use of the term to formal statistical or quantitative analysis.
See Michael Heise, The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal
Scholarship: Judicial Decision Making and the New Empiricism, 2002 U. ILL. L.
REV. 819, 824-26. I use the term more broadly to include any data generated
from observation, measurement or experimentation. See Epstein & King, supra
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all policy-oriented legal scholarship makes claims about the
law, its real world effects, and the likely outcomes of legal
reform.268 In the past, however, legal scholarship has not
typically employed rigorous empirical methods, relying
instead upon “soft” empiricism (such as informal surveying
or case studies) or mining the empirical work of other
disciplines.269 Recent debates over empiricism in law provide
numerous examples of a variety of deficiencies with such
informal empiricism,270 although these problems are hardly
limited to the legal literature.271 And while drawing out the
policy implications of others’ empirical studies is a
legitimate scholarly exercise, the danger there is the misuse
of the empirical evidence—including misunderstanding the
scope or outcome of the study, over-claiming, and ignoring
contradictory studies or evidence.272
And yet, while strong empirical analysis clearly is
desirable, standing alone its absence does not render the
conventional construction irrelevant to academic discourse
or policy formulation. Information about the world will
always be incomplete and the effects of regulation on
behavior uncertain.273 As the economics literature
note 265, at 2-3; Gregory Mitchell, Empirical Legal Scholarship as Scientific
Dialogue, 83 N.C. L. REV. 167, 198 (2004).
268. George, supra note 265, at 146.
269. See Stewart Macaulay, Contracts, New Legal Realism, and Improving the
Navigation of The Yellow Submarine, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1161, 1185-86 (2006)
(discussing use of empirical studies by legal scholars).
270. See Epstein & King, supra note 265; Lempert, supra note 264.
271. See Lempert, supra note 264, at 915-22 (detailing issues associated with
two policy-oriented empirical studies by sociologists). Compare Episten & King,
supra note 256 (discussing how the rules of inference used in social sciences
should be adapted into legal scholarship), with Frank Cross et al., Above the
Rules: A Response to Epstein and King, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 135, 135 (2002)
(arguing that Epstein and King “violate[] many of their own rules of inference”
during their assault of legal scholarship).
272. See Stewart Macaulay, Contracts, New Legal Realism, and Improving the
Navigation of the Yellow Submarine, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1161, 1186 (2006)
(discussing the pitfalls of such mining operations, and citing Jacqueline
Macaulay, Some Barriers to Drawing Conclusions from Social Science Research
(Jan. 1979) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of Wisconsin
Law School, available at www.law.wisc.edu/facstaff/macaulay/papers/barriers.
pdf) (discussing ten common problems to drawing conclusions).
273. See Russell Korobkin, Possibility and Plausibility in Law and Economics,
32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 781, 786 (2005).
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demonstrates, theoretical frameworks based on largely
unproven empirical assumptions can be useful in developing
and evaluating policy options, so long as the author and
those relying upon their work keep in mind the empirical
limitations.274 It is perhaps here that we can draw the most
useful lessons from the case of the conventional construction
by considering the historically “persuasion mode” in which
legal scholarship has operated.275
Numerous commentators have observed that legal
scholarship is largely instrumental in nature; we are in the
business of trying to convince our audience—be they judges,
legislators, or regulators—to adopt, or modify or reject a
particular policy.276 As lawyers we are well versed in the
power of the narrative, trained to craft persuasive stories
from constructed facts.277 In the adversarial context of
litigation, such stories compete before the judge or jury.
Within the community of scholars, narratives likewise vie
274. As Clint Eastwood rightly observed, “A man’s got to know his
limitations.” MAGNUM FORCE (The Malpaso Campany 1973). Thus, for example,
economists and consumers of their work are vulnerable to criticism when they
treat central assumptions of microeconomic theory such as rationality and
complete information as fact. See MARY ZEY, RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY AND
ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY 87-113 (1998); see also DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN
MICROECONOMIC THEORY 724-29 (1990).
275. See generally Richard K. Neumann, Jr. & Stefan H. Krieger, Empirical
Inquiry Twenty-Five Years After The Lawyering Process, 10 CLINICAL L. REV.
349, 355 (2003) (explaining how lawyers take a persuasion mode to their work
compared to scientists who attempt to learn as much as possible).
276. See Chambliss, supra note 264, at 26-28 (discussing the use of student
edited articles as a ground to have articles published, regardless of relevance or
credibility); Epstein & King, supra note 265, at 9-11 (discussing lawyer’s
responsibility to produce work that is reliable, not just one-sided); Korobkin,
supra note 273, at 785 (“Legal scholarship seeks to provide policy guidance to
lawmakers . . . .”). But see Neumann & Krieger, supra note 275, at 385 (“What
generates prestige in the legal academy is the doctrinal or theoretical article
that causes other academics to say “Wow!” even if no judge, legislator, or other
policy maker would care about it or even understand it.”).
277. See David Luban, Difference Made Legal: The Court and Dr. King, 87
MICH. L. REV. 2152, 2154 (1989) (“Holmes was therefore wrong: The life of the
law is neither logic nor experience, but narrative and the only partially civilized
struggle for the power it conveys.”); Austin Sarat, Narrative Strategy and Death
Penalty Advocacy, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 353, 357 (1996); see, e.g., Timothy
A. Canova, Banking and Financial Reform at the Crossroads of the Neoliberal
Contagion, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1571, 1592-94 (1999) (discussing use of legal
reform narratives in the context of international monetary policies).
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for dominance, attempting to persuade their audience of
other scholars, policy-makers and judges to adopt their
respective recommendations.278 Some critics argue that legal
training, with its focus on adversarial interactions in the
litigation setting, leads legal scholars to avoid or ignore
evidence or competing theories that contradict or
undermine their favored theories.279
I suspect that legal training in advocacy has some role
to play here, although the most vocal critics likely overstate
it a bit. While it is true that the lawyer as an advocate is
bound to present the best case for his or her client, the
sophisticated practitioner recognizes that ignoring or hiding
substantial counterarguments or injurious facts will often
undermine a case. Rather, effective strategic lawyering
involves aggressive identification and evaluation of a case’s
vulnerabilities and anticipation of the adversary’s likely
counterarguments. Even in presenting one’s case to the
judge or other decision maker, lawyers will often address
weaknesses or counterarguments directly. Indeed, the rules
of professional conduct even go so far as to require
disclosure of contrary authority or material facts in certain
circumstances.280 Moreover, when acting as counselor rather
than advocate, a lawyer risks malpractice should he or she
fail to discuss the full range of options—warts and all—with
the client.
That said, it is plausible that given the persuasive
nature of legal scholarship, our shared experience of legal
training tends to encourage legal scholars to strategically
present contrary arguments and facts in the light most
favorable to their proffered recommendations. Two other
factors related to the pursuit of persuasiveness may also be
at play, one motivational and the other cognitive. First, the
incentive structure for legal scholars places great emphasis
on originality—either identifying new policy problems or
crafting innovative solutions to problems. Where a problem
has already been articulated by others, many scholars may
see less value in expending substantial analytic resources
evaluating the underlying problem definition itself.

278. Rubin, supra note 16, at 1892-94.
279. Epstein & King, supra note 265, at 9-10; Lempert, supra note 264, at 922.
280. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2009).
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Second, the desire to make a persuasive case, to win the
competition, could affect a legal scholar’s reasoning at the
preconscious level. In a variety of circumstances,
psychologists have demonstrated that where decision
makers have a preferred outcome, they are apt to evaluate
confirming and disconfirming information so as to support
that outcome.281 This tendency has been observed among
individuals engaged in a range of higher level thinking,
including such activities as evaluating scientific research,
making investment decisions, and analyzing tax issues.282
This is not to say that preconscious biases run completely
roughshod over critical thinking; there are limits to its
influence. Nonetheless, such cognitive biases may play some
role in the willingness of scholars to embrace the
conventional construction despite its thin empirical support.
Clearly, the pervasive lack of empirical support for the
conventional construction suggests legal scholars in this
area should give greater attention to the careful
development and evaluation of empirical data.283 At a
minimum, the quality of the debate would be much
improved if scholars tempered their narratives with open,
self-critical identification and evaluation of their essential
underlying assumptions. That is not to say that legal
scholarship on environmental regulatory policy is devoid of
such self-reflection, but only that more of it would be
281. See Jürgen Beckmann & Julius Kuhl, Altering Information to Gain Action
Control: Functional Aspects of Human Information Processing in Decision
Making, 18 J. RES. PERSONALITY 224, 226-27 (1984) (affecting the search for
information and skewing the evaluation of the collected information); Ziva
Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480 (1990)
(surveying the literature); Henry Montgomery, Towards a Perspective Theory of
Decision Making and Judgment, 87 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 155, 168-69 (1994)
(suggesting that individuals adjust the evaluation process so that the favored
alternative appears superior to other alternatives on at least one attribute and
at least equal to them on other attributes). Researchers have identified this
tendency in various related phenomena such as motivated reasoning, biased
pre-decision processing, and bidirectional processing. See Timothy F. Malloy,
Disclosure Stories, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 617, 651-52 (2005).
282. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(2) (2009) (requiring
advocates to disclose to the court “legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction
known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not
disclosed by opposing counsel”).
283. See Rubin, supra note 16, at 1896 (suggesting that legal scholars “make
more extensive, but more controlled use of empirical data”).
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helpful.284 Clear and open articulation of underlying
assumptions and empirical vulnerabilities could engender
more robust dialogue across competing constructions.
However, acknowledging and engaging plausible
competing constructions comes at a price. Even with more
attention to real-world empirical information and selfconscious deliberation, it is unlikely that one construction of
the regulatory system—broadly defined to include the
regulated and regulators—will conclusively win the day.
Granted we may be able to reach a consensus on whether
the statutes expressly require the use of specific technology
or not—even in the post-modern era. But once we move
beyond that fairly straightforward issue to questions of how
regulators and the regulated act and interact, and what
their relative capacities are, empirical judgments will often
be more tentative, contingent and time-consuming.
Consider the functional form of the rigidity proposition: do
firms adopt reference technologies because of bureaucratic
pressure, because they mimic other firms, or because the
reference technologies are the best fit? My guess is that it is
a mix of these factors with their relative weights varying in
different contexts. Quantifying that mix through empirical
studies will likely be exceedingly difficult and resourceintensive and in many cases could even be inconclusive.
That is not to suggest that empirical approaches should
be rejected, only that as a practical matter they may often
be unable to resolve conflicts between constructions
decisively. For example, in some instances, the results will
not be conclusive while in others the cost of such studies
may be unreasonably high. Policymaking marches on,
however, and legal scholarship bent on influencing the
direction of that policy requires timely resolution of
284. For example, in his classic article on administrative law, Professor
Stewart expressly acknowledged that common assumptions about the efficiency
of firms may be overstated, but then dismissed that point with minimal
discussion. See Stewart, supra note 5, at 1281 n.76 (“Because large firms
‘satisfice’ and do not engage in ruthless and continuing cost minimization,
regulatory controls may trigger ‘search’ efforts that tap neglected opportunities.
But such effects are presumably random, and their magnitude quite
uncertain.”); see also Neil Gunningham & Darren Sinclair, Regulatory
Pluralism: Designing Policy Mixes for Environmental Protection, 21 LAW & POL’Y
49, 60 (1999) (stating that increased self regulation can “stimulate innovative
activity”).
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conflicting constructions. For such cases I offer two possible
strategies for consideration here; no doubt there are more.
First, competing constructions could be evaluated in
terms of relative plausibility, what Russell Korobkin called
the “plausibility competition.”285 Scholars would evaluate
each construction’s essential assumptions against the
existing relevant data, including formal quantitative and
qualitative research, as well as anecdotal and other
informal information. In making policy recommendations,
scholars should rely upon the construction that appears
most plausible against the available empirical backdrop.286
Clearly this is not the scientific method, nor is it immune to
cognitive, social and other influences that can bias decision
making.287 Nonetheless, a similar “relative plausibility”
concept has been adopted in policymaking under conditions
of uncertainty in fisheries management.288 And it has the
noteworthy virtue of focusing attention squarely on the
available evidence regarding the law in action, with explicit
acknowledgement of the limitations of that evidence.

285. Korobkin, supra note 273, at 791.
286. Professor Korobkin did not define “plausibility” or provide criteria for its
measurement. For examples of such criteria, see HARMON R. HOLCOMB,
SOCIOBIOLOGY, SEX, AND SCIENCE 98-101 (David Edward Shane ed., 1993)
(describing five criteria for plausibility). Holcomb views plausibility as a
threshold hurdle to be overcome before an explanatory story is worthy of more
rigorous hypothesis testing. See Rebecca A. Rademeyer et al., Tips and Tricks in
Designing Management Procedures, 64 ICES J. MARINE SCI. 618, 625 (2007)
(“[Plausibility is] the likelihood of a scenario considered in simulation trials
representing reality relative to other scenarios also under consideration . . . .”).
287. See Jonathan Klick & Gregory Mitchell, Government Regulation of
Irrationality: Moral and Cognitive Hazards, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1620, 1660-61
(2006).
288. See D. Kolody et al., Salvaged Pearls: Lessons Learned from a
Floundering Attempt to Develop a Management Procedure for Southern Bluefin
Tuna, 94 FISHERIES RES. 339, 346 (2008) (discussing process by which competing
management assumption were given weights based on relative plausibility);
COMM. ON ECOSYSTEM EFFECTS OF FISHING, OCEAN STUDIES BD., DYNAMIC
CHANGES IN MARINE ECOSYSTEMS: FISHING, FOOD WEBS, AND FUTURE OPTIONS 7879 (2006) (“The goal of the analytical exercise is not to build models that are
able to predict what will happen, but to build a series of models and hypotheses
of what may happen and to assign relative plausibilities to them so that
tradeoffs between conflicting management objectives will be explicit when
decisions are made.”).
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As one might expect, I believe that the alternative
construction is significantly more plausible than the
conventional
construction.
Regarding
the
rigidity
proposition, there is essentially no support for the notion
that the statute or regulations mandate particular
technologies. There is uncertainty as to the functional form
of the rigidity proposition; I previously acknowledged that
the conventional and alternative constructions both present
plausible stories.289 The conventional literature provides
little support for the homogeneity proposition, while the
alternative construction’s notion of variegated standards
finds strong corroboration in actual rulemaking
proceedings. To be sure, the standards are not precisely
molded to each facility’s specific circumstances, but neither
are they the “one-size-fits-all” portrayed by the conventional
construction.290 In terms of the relative capacities, here
again the discussion in Part IV demonstrates that the
alternative construction makes the more plausible case. The
conventional construction offers nothing more than
intuition and rhetoric. The alternative construction is
grounded in available research regarding individual
organizational
practices,
trade
associations,
and
government information collection authorities and
practices.291
Rather than choosing between competing constructions
through the relative plausibility approach, scholars or
policymakers may adopt a hedging strategy. Here one
assumes that both constructions have some validity, and
attempts to identify policies that result in the best overall
outcome under either construction. In some cases, the
hedging approach may be akin to the dominant strategy in
game theory;292 that is, the chosen policy would result in the
optimum outcome regardless of which construction is more
“accurate.” In other instances, a trade-off may be necessary
in which the policymaker would incur some cost in exchange
for covering both constructions.
Emissions taxes offer a useful example here. Under the
conventional construction, emission taxes set at the proper
289. See supra Part III(B) and text accompanying notes 167-71.
290. See supra Part IV.
291. See id.
292. DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 11 (1994).
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level should lead to efficient pollution reductions.293 Taking
advantage of local knowledge regarding its operations and
market information concerning available technological
options, the firm will seek out the most efficient pollution
management strategy. The alternative construction, with its
markedly less heroic view of business adaptability, would
anticipate substantial internal and market barriers to the
identification and diffusion of innovative technologies. For
example, barriers could include organizational inertia
resulting from entrenched standard operating procedures or
distorted information in the market regarding emerging
technologies.294 A hedging approach would adopt the
environmental tax, but supplement it with measures
intended to overcome that inertia. Such measures could
include some form of mandatory technology options analysis
forcing the firm to engage in a systematic search for
alternatives, or government-supported demonstration
projects or technical assistance.295
Even as policymakers strive to resolve the classic
concerns of environmental law regarding toxic and
conventional air emissions, water pollution and the like,
they face new and emerging issues of global proportion.
Climate change mitigation and adaptation cast a long
shadow over virtually every human activity and are
spawning regulatory responses at every level of
government. Likewise, a broad range of policymakers and
stakeholders are beginning to address chemical policy
reform and the proliferation of nanotechnology and
nanomaterials in commerce. Legal scholarship has played a
293. Thomas A. Barthold, Issues in the Design of Environmental Excise Taxes,
8 J. ECON. PERSP. 133, 135 (1994). Such Pigouvian taxes would be set so as to
impose the social cost of the activity on the polluter. Malloy & Sinsheimer,
supra note 48, at 219.
294. See supra text accompanying footnotes 204-06; Richard P. Rumelt, Inertia
and Transformation 6-15 (INSEAD Working Paper No. 94/62/SM, 1994)
(discussing a range of causes of organizational inertia), abstract available at,
http://www.insead.edu/facultyresearch/research/details_papers.cfm?id=12853;
see also Stephen J. DeCanio, The Efficiency Paradox: Bureaucratic and
Organizational Barriers to Profitable Energy-Saving Investments, 26 ENERGY
POL’Y 441 (1998) (discussing the “efficiency paradox,” in which firms reject
profitable energy-saving investments due to organizational factors).
295. See Ashford, supra note 257, at 97-98 (discussing technology options
analysis); Malloy & Sinsheimer, supra note 48, at 217-18 (describing the nature
and purpose of demonstration projects).
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significant role in policy debates in these and other areas,
and no doubt will continue to do so. Self-reflective attention
to the constructions adopted in these areas—constructions
regarding the nature and causes of concern as well as the
behavior and capacities of regulated and regulators—could
enhance those debates and ultimately improve the efficacy
of the resulting policies.

